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Introduction
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MagLifter, as defined here, is an advanced, earth-bound catapult system to provide the initial lift for
earth orbiting vehicles to reduce or eliminate the need for multistage propulsion, thus reducing the
cost of orbital space flight. It is presumed that magnetic levitation will catapult the vehicle to a
desired initial velocity sufficient for reaching orbit with the vehicles own engines. Of necessity, the
system must be located on and around a mountain with sufficient relief to allow the catapult to
accelerate the launch vehicle to a sufficient speed in the desired direction to allow it to reach orbit.
Such a mountain site must meet criteria consistent with current and future space launch needs and
conditions.
It is the purpose of this report to set forth preliminary criteria for choosing a suitable maglifier site.
This report represents the initial submittal of the MagLifter Siting Criteria Report (MSCR) for
Subtask 1.A of the MagLifter Site Investigation, Constructability Analysis, and Implementation
Strategies Study, performed by the Colorado Office of Space Advocacy (COSA) for Marshall Space
Flight Center.
The report is divided into four major sections: (1) Assumed Launch System and Flight Vehicle
Characteristics; (2) Task 1.A - Initial Site Selection Criteria; (3) Conclusions; (4) Appendix - Phases
of the Site Selection Process.
Assumed Launch System and Flight Vehicle Characteristics
The following is assumed to develop the site characteristics and site selection criteria. Further
clarification and enhancement of these assumptions is necessary to support the completion of Task
1 and the performance of Task 2.
Flight Vehicle Characteristics:
1. The vehicle will have a rocket or hybrid propulsion system with the following fuels:
a. Cryogenic fuels
b. Jet fuel
c. No hypergolic fuels
. Profile
a.
b.
C.
d.
of the vehicle will be aerodynamic with the following dimensions:
140 foot length
60 foot wingspan
20 foot outside diameter for the payload bay/fuselage
Total weight - about 1 million lbs
. Payload capability:
a. 20,000 lbs to low earth orbit (LEO)
b. 5,000 lbs to GEO orbit
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. Operation:
a. Unmanned
b. Single stage operation after separation from catapult sled
c. Teleoperation capability for initial stages of flight
Flight Mode:
1. Single stage to orbit
2. Flight vehicle returns to site on own power and either lands vertically or
on runway as does a conventional airplane.
3. No ferry for vehicle unless alternate landing site chosen
MagLifter Configuration:
1. The MagLifter catapult will comprise the following:
a. Sled to carry launch vehicle on a track
c. Track about three miles long in a tunnel
d. Tunnel to be a cut into the mountain with a cover where possible and
a tunnel bore where necessary
e. Initial span of tunnel slightly inclined or horizontal
f. Final span of tunnel inclined equal to or greater than 45 °
g. Continuation of track beyond the tunnel exit for sled deceleration: 1 to 2 miles
h. Magnetic levitation and momentum source for flight vehicle
i. Tunnel muzzle or escape velocity of vehicle - 600 mph
j. South polar and equatorial tunnel orientations: 150 ° to 180 ° azimuth
k. Tunnel enclosure with back-flow protection at escape end.
, Catapult/Vehicle forces will not exceed the following:
a. Braking forces not to exceed 3.0 g's
b. Curvature of tunnel and track to limit lateral load to 1.5 g's
Ground Support System:
1. Launch track as defined above
2. Initial processing facilities located on flat ground away from track
3. Final processing facilities located near entry of launch track
4. Refurbishment/Repair facilities on flat ground
5. Fuel storage on or in flat ground
6. Emergency landing/abort "runway" directly down range of tunnel exit
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Ground Support System Charactistics:
1. Transportation facilities
a. Runway/Heliport - for landing flight vehicles, for supply and emergency craft
b. Rail - local spur to site with connection to a main line.
c. Surface roads - local and with connection to state, federal or interstate high
ways
d. Support facilities for vehicles, vehicle maintenance, and road surfaces
e. local pipelines for fuels and other fluids/gases
. Storage
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
facilities and environmental (weather, etc.) protection facilities
Underground fuel tanks segregated for each fuel type
Above-ground storage facilities for fuel and fuel handling
Pipelines or other transportation to flight vehicle processing facilities
Hangers for flight vehicles and MagLifter sleds
Sheds for support vehicles, aircraft, etc.
Repair shops
Spare parts and component storage
. Power
a.
b°
C.
d.
generation and storage:
Type - wind, solar, power grid, combination, etc. Depends on location and
other factors.
Storage - capacitors, fly wheels, etc.
Quantity - to be determined
Source - to be determined
. Ground support equipment:
a. Support, repair and maintenance equipment
Vehicles
MagLifter track and tunnel
Operations equipment and facilities
Operations support, e.g., snow removal equipment, snow cats, etc.
b. Emergency equipment
Flight equipment (helicopters)
Medical (ambulances and emergency medical)
Fire fighting equipment
Other
5. Operations buildings
,
Personnel habitation facilities:
a. Housing for permanent personnel
b. Recreational facilities
c. Emergency/Medical facilities
d. Educational facilities, if no town nearby
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Task 1.1 - Initial Site Selection Criteria
Based on the foregoing specifications of required facilities for MagLifter, site criteria are presented
in the following sections. Criteria are developed for several physical site attributes: geology, ge-
ography, topography, climate and weather, transporatation, power, and proximity to support
services.
Geology of the Mountain Launch Site:
Geological stability for the track and support facilities is the critical criterion for the MagLifter site.
To insure stability, the site should have the following positive and negative attributes.
1. The country rock (subsoil rock or bedrock) should be "crystalline:" igneous or metamor-
phic, preferably granite or granodiorite or their metamorphic equivalents, for maximum compe-
tency. If sedimentary, thick limestone, dolomite or competent sandstone might be suitable.
2. The formations on which the track is built must be massive and uniform in composition,
mineralogy, texture, mechanical strength and weatherability to sustain static and dynamic loads:
weight, vibration and seismic activity.
3. If the country rock is sedimentary, the foundation bed should have thickness of at least
100 feet below the track of uniformly competent and mechanically strong rock.
4. There should be minimal crossing of lithologic boundaries along the length of the track.
5. There must be no shales, mudstones or similar incompetent beds immediately below the
track site to jeopardize track stability. If bedrock is sedimentary, there must be no significant
amounts of clay minerals, particularly smectites and/or illite-smectites or other clays in the bedrock
to cause instability. Acceptable depths below the track for shales will depend on strength and water
saturation properties of the shales or other materials.
6. There must be minimal fractures and faults in the bedrock. Fractures and faults represent
rock weakness and become conduits for weathering. Weathering produces clays or dissolution,
leading to incompetency. Fractures, which are nearly always present, should have their main
direction parallel to the track if possible.
7. The bedrock at the rail site should have minimal weathering at depth and show no evidence
of current hydrotherrnal activity. Weathered and hydrothermally altered material has low mechani-
cal strength and competency. Acceptable weathering depth depends on location and distance from
the track.
8. The bedrock must be stable. There should be no seismic activity (earthquakes) in the area
greater than "4" on the Richter scale. There should be no volcanic activity in close proximity, nor
significant explosive, ash-producing, volcanic activity in the direction of the prevailing wind.
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9. Surfacestabilityof thebedrockdemandsthattherebenotalusslopesandparticularlyno
talusslopeswith intercalatedclay-richbeds(shalesormudstones)anywherenearthetrack, andthat
therebeno transmissionof track vibration to the groundfacilities, especiallyfuel pipelinesand
powertransmissionandstoragesystems,whichmustbeburiedbelowfrostline(about6 feetdeep).
10.Groundwatershouldbeaminimum,especiallyif oneormoreshaftsand/ortunnelsmust
bebored.
11. The"cut" for thetrackmustgo intobedrock(belowtheCandinto theD soil horizon).
Topography of the Mountain Launch Site:
The topography of the mountain chosen as the launch site is as important as the bedrock geology in
defining a suitable site for MagLifter. The following define criteria for the topography of the
mountain site for MagLifter. It is clear from the topographic criteria listed below that the mountain
chosen as the launch site should be as isolated as possible from other mountain neighbors and
surrounded by flat or nearly flat land.
1. The topography on the north, track side of the mountain must have an incline of at least
45 ° at the at the top of the slope where the MagLifter sled exits the tunnel.
2. There must be at least relief(mountain base to crest) of 4000 to 5000 feet to attain 600 mph
tunnel exit speed. Part of the relief could be attained with a shaft below grade.
3. There should be a piedmont of about 1.5 miles long of 3 to 5 degrees positive slope toward
the foot of the mountain for the initial acceleration of the vehicle.
4. There should be a gradual transition from piedmont through the final incline for uniform
acceleration of the vehicle.
5. The track must be located on the north face of the mountain for a south or southeast launch
to accomodate a Mid-CONUS launch to attain the orbits previously defined.
6. The crest of the mountain should have a long flat or a gentle down-slope about 1.5 miles
long to continue the track for deceleration of the sled after launching the flight vehicle. However,
the sled could vere in direction to right or left of launch trajectory.
7. There should be a wide flat area on the post-launch trajectory for emergency abort of the
flight vehicle.
8. Topography at the top of mountain should allow exit of vehicle below the top to minimize
effect of winds on the crest.
9. There must be sufficient flat land near the launch mountain for a runway for normal and
certain emergency landings of the launch vehicle and aircraft landings.
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Ground System Topography:
The MagLifter site must have specific characteristics for the ground support system. Those
topographic features and distances from the launch tunnel depend on final configuration and
composition of elements of the ground system and operational senario. Initial criteria are as follows.
Additional criteria will be developed as the ground system definition evolves.
1. There must be contiguous flat areas for support system facilities, including flight vehicle
processing, and vehicle, equipment, fuels and other storage within an easily transportable distance
to the launch tunnel entrance.
2. There must be flat to gradual inclines for power systems: power generation and storage
facilities and for the interface with the power grid. This area may be several miles from the launch
site.
3. There must be a flat area for one or more runways properly oriented with the prevailing
wind directions: generally W-NW in winter, W-SW in summer. These runways must serve the
MagLifter flight vehicle, support, supply, and emergency aircraft (fixed wing and rotor).
4. There must be sufficient accessable area for emergency support facilities. These facilities
will be at the launch site, at normal runways, and down range at the emergency abort landing site.
Mountain Environment:
There are certain criteria that the enviornment must sustain for normal and emergency contingencies:
1. The top of the launch-site mountain should be above tree line to prevent fires from the
flames from the rocket engines during normal launches and emergency-aborted operations.
2. Down range (the distance to be detemined), in the direction of the launch trajectory, the
land should be bare of trees and forests to prevent forest fires in case of emergency-aborted flights.
3. The area used for fuel and power storage should be free of trees to limit accidental fires.
4. Wetlands at the base of mountains should be minimal in area to avoid costly construction
and maintenence costs.
5. Landslide- and snowslide-prevalent areas must be avoided.
Weather and Climate:
Although weather and climate extremes should be avoided, almost all mountain environments with
sufficient height, relief, and other attributes to satisfy launch criteria will have some extremes in
wind, temperature, cloud, and precipitation conditions. The following are desireable criteria:
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l, Wind - the site with the least wind will be preferred, otherwise note the following:
a. Surface to 20,000 feet - consistent wind direction during extended periods during
the 24 hour day. The ideal site would have no wind during launch periods.
b. Launch site should avoid the jet stream for most polar launches.
c. Equatorial launches - Use jet stream to "hitch a ride" when possible; otherwise,
the site should be chosen to avoid the jet stream as much as possible.
d. High altitude trade winds and jet stream - Use when possible, but avoid if possible.
They are favorable in Northern Colorado, Wyoming and Montana in the surn-
mer, and favorable in New Mexico and Southern Colorado in the winter.
2. Temperature - the site with the least temperature variation will be the preferred site,
specifically,
a. Diurnal and seasonal variations in temperature should be minimal to reduce the cost
of protecting flight vehicles, the MagLifter tunnel, fuel storage and other
facilities.
b. Moderate temperatures from mountain base to crest are desireable.
. Climate - the site with moderate temperatures, but low precipitation will be preferred.
a. A dry climate site is most desireable to lessen ground and surface water problems
and environmental dangers.
b. A dry climate (<10 " of annual precipitation) also has the advantage of lower
population density in the immediate area and down range.
c. Moderate annual temperatures are desireable to reduce costs of construction,
operation, and maintenance.
d. Moderate temperatures are most desireable for personnel working environments.
o Other factors -
a. Factors such as rain, snow, ice, frost heave, etc., at mountain top or base should
not present problems in dry climates, but could present significant problems
at the mountain side, where there may the potential for landslides and at the
mountain base, where there tend to be wetlands, even in dry climates.
b. Areas with torrential rains that spawn landslides should be avoided.
Transportation and Power:
Accessability and transportation to and from the site is critical. Mountain sites are frequently
inaccessable, except by narrow, expensive and dangerous roads. The MagLifier site must be more
easily accessable by multiple forms of transportation than the average mountain site. The need for
roadway and air transportation access to the site is obvious. For environmental reasons, rail access
is necessary to deliver hazardous fuels and flight vehicles to the site, as well as to deliver other
materials. The following represent criteria for transportation access and facilities:
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1. Thesitemustallowrail accesstothesitefor deliveryand/orremovalofvehicles,materials,
andfuel: accessto amajorrouteshouldbe lessthan10milesfrom thesite, with aspurline to the
site.
2. Thesite mustallow rail accesswithin thesite to conveyflight vehiclesandmaterials
locally to supportlaunch.
3. Thesitemustallowaccessto majorstate,federalor interstatehighwayswithin about30
miles,andif possible,within 10miles.
4. Theroadto thesitefrom thetrunkroadmustbeoverterrainallowingtransportof heavy
andlargetractor/trailervehicleswithoutexcessdangerto transportersor to theenvironment.
5. Thesitemustalloweasilyuseableroadswithin thesite.
6. Thesitemustsupportsufficientaviationfacilitieswithin afewmilesof the launchsitefor
landingof flight vehicles,transportationof personnelandmaterialsto andfrom thesite, andfor
emergencyuse.
a. Thefacilitiesmustsupportfixedwingandrotoraircraftfor normalandemergency
use.
b. Thesitemustallowasufficientrunway,dependingonflight vehicleconfiguration
andmodeof flight, to allownormal landingsof theflight vehicles.
c. Theaviationfacilitiesmusthavereasonableweatherconditionsall year.
7. MagLifter requireslargeamountsof electricalpowerfor ashortperiodsof timeandmore
normalamountsof electricalpower,correspondingto thatof aremoteminingoperation. Thesite
thereforerequiresthefollowing:
a. Thesitemusthavemajoraccessto thepowergrid within afew milesof thesite.
b. Thesitemustbeableto host,within closeproximity,massiveelectricalstorage,
eithermechanicalor capacitance.
c. Thesitemayneed,within closeproximity, its own powergeneratingcapability.
If it hasits ownpowergeneration,thegridmustbeavailabletoacceptexcess
power.
Human Population and Culture:
The mountain MagLifter site will of necessity and desireability be remote from populated areas.
However, the site must be located to provide access to the cultural, social, educational, and life-
sustaining necessities for the personnel working at the site. Frequently in the Western U. S., towns
are 100 miles apart. It is common for workers to commute from the towns 50 miles to their work,
as miners have done for many years. It is anticipated that many or most personnel and their families
would live in towns away from the MagLifter site. However, some personnel must live at or near
the site. For the site residents and those who commute from towns, the following are essential:
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1. There must be access by ground transportation (bus or car), to one or more towns with
shopping, entertainment/recreation, and schools within 45-50 minutes.
2. There must be access to emergency medical facilities by air within 50 to 60 minutes.
3. The site environs must support at least limited personnel housing, communication for
education and entertainment, possible limited schooling, and stores and cafes. This local population
center must be within a few miles of the launch site.
Conclusions
The criteria for a MagLifter site as outlined above are reasonably strict, and will eliminate certain
areas and mountains inside and outside ofCONUS. For example, the criteria will probably eliminate
sites such as the Andes of Equador, the Coast Ranges of California, Oregon, and Washington because
of earthquakes, volcanic activity, and other factors.
With the resonably strict criteria, it is probable that there will be no more than 10 to 15 sites in the
U. S. that can meet most of the criteria. There are those criteria that cannot be compromised, such
as many of the geologic criteria and some of the topographic criteria. However, for criteria, such as
those having to do with weather and climate, tradeoffs are possible.
Some criteria have feasible alternatives. For example, for a mountain with relatively low relief,
shafts could be bored to extend the length of the MagLifter track to give the proper acceleration to
the flight vehicle, or to increase the angle of the track.
This preliminary specification of site criteria for MagLifter omits some specific criteria. Some of the
important criteria are those having to do with specific, down-range safety factors for both human and
environmental safety. These specific criteria will depend on the type of flight vehicles and the
character of the flight, which are not now known.
In defining site criteria, is is clear that the site, MagLifter, and the flight vehicle will be mated to
each other. The criteria established in this report are primarily those to provide a site to launch a fixed
wing, aerodymanic vehicle. However, when the criteria are considered together, other vehicle
configurations could make the total MagLifter concept more feasible, more efficient, less expensive,
and safer, at the same time increasing site and other options. For example, a flight vehicle concept
similar to the DSX, using MagLifter for launch, would add capability and flexibility to the DSX
concept, while reducing the cost per pound of payload, and significantly reducing the cost of the
MagLifter facility. Such a concept would reduce the size and shape of the MagLifter tunnel from
large elliptical size to a smaller more nearly circular size, reduce the space and cost of normal and
emergency landing facilities, reduce hazards down range, increase the angle of launch, and incresase
the quality of the site. The next phase of this study should consider sites with other vehicle concepts
in mind.
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Finally, whenthepreliminarysiting criteriaaretakentogether,TheMagLifter conceptnot only
appearsfeasible,buteconomicallysound,with theright flight vehicle.
Appendix- Phases of the Site Selection Process
The following are the research phases to choose physical, geological and geographic sites suitable
for launching single-stage space vehicles into equatorial and/or polar earth orbits. This report
represents Tasks 1.A, the early research of the multi-phase project to locate and characterize suitable
launch sites. Phase 1 tasks are to be accomplished as part of the MagLifter site Selections,
Constructability Analysis, and Implementation Strategies Study. Phases 2 - 4 will be performed as
future studies. Only the portions of Phases 1 - 4 related to site selection are documented below.
Phase 1 - The following specific tasks constitute the preliminary site identification phase.
Task 1.1 - Prelimininary Site Criteria: Meeting with NASA and others, followed by a
written report to establish technical criteria for choosing a MagLifter launch site for launching single
stage ballistic and/or aerodynamic vehicles for both prototype and full-scale operation. The meeting
and report shall include establishing criteria for potential orbits, launch directions, trajectories,
launch safety, vehicle manuverablity, and structural strength for launch under various physical con-
ditions, etc. Other criteria to establish are down-range factors, launch site access, on-site facilities.
Estimated time required: 10 days.
Participants: NASA, Geologist and Principal Investigator (PI: M. Slaughter), Systems
Engineer and Co-Principle Investigator (CPI: P. Burke), and others.
Deliverables for Task 1.1: Written report documenting preliminary criteria for choosing a
MagLifter flight vehicle mountain launch site.
Task 1.2 - Map Study Site Selection: In conjunction with criteria specified in the report
from Task 1.A (this report), identify through office and library research, approximately 10-15
mountain sites in the United States and selected sites outside the U.S., potentially suitable for single
stage launch sites for prototype and full-scale vehicles. Base identification on criteria established
above: feasible trajectories, topography, geology, seismic activity, geography, overflight safety,
preliminary geological tunneling and excavation feasiblity, environmental feasibility, weather and
climate, access. Prepare report for Task 1.B for NASA.
Time required: 5 months
Participants: PI, CPI and Colorado School of Mines (CSM) tunneling/excavation expert
consultant.
Travel required: PI, local travel in Denver and Boulder, CO area
Deliverables for Task 1.2: Report with maps and recommendations for the next phase of
site investigation. The report shall contain maps and advantages and disadvantages of each site
selected, with recommendations for follow-up studies. The report shall also list and give reasons to
eliminate other sites.
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Phase2 - This phasewill selectamongthepreliminarilychosensitesfor furtherstudyandon-site
reconnaisance.
Task 2.1 - Site Selection for Feasibility Study: In conjunction with NASA and others,
choose approximately 5 or 6 sites for reconnaisance field feasibility study from the 10-15 potential
sites selected during Phase 1
Estimated time required: 10 days
Participants: PI, CPI, and tunneling/excavation expert, NASA personnel
Travel required: PI, CPI and tunneling expert to NASA
Deliverables for Task 2.1: Written report documenting selection of Phase 2 sites for
choosing a MagLifter flight vehicle mountain launch site.
Task 2.2 - Site Reconnaisance : Add to the library/office studies of the 5 or 6 selected sites
chosen from the selection of Task 2.2. Plan site visits to each of the selected sites. Reconnoiter each
of the sites to verify, add to, and update the preliminary data. At each site spend approximately one
week's reconnaisance of the site and environs. Prepare report for Task 2.2, updating preliminary
Task 2.1 report.
Estimated time required: 6 months
Participants: PI, CPI, geological field assistant, tunnel/excavation
expert consultant
Travel required: Subsistence and travel expenses for PI and field assistant for ten
weeks and tunneling expert for 3 weeks, local travel in Denver area
Deliverables for Task 2.2: Report with maps and recommendations for the next phase of
site investigation. The report shall contain maps and advantages and disadvantages of each site
selected, with recommendations for selection and necessary follow-up studies.
Phase 3 - This phase reduces the number of sites to perhaps 2 or 3 sites
Task 3.1 - In conjunction with NASA, choose 2 or 3 of the best sites from the 5 or 6 sites
selected in the previous phase for preliminary site characterization and comprehensive feasibility
study. Establish final site criteria based on all available data, including flight vehicle and site
construction engineering.
Estimated time required: 30 days
Participants: PI, CPI and tunneling/excavation expert, NASA and other personnel
Travel required: Travel to NASA facility
Deliverables of Task 3.1: Report detailing sites chosen with rationale for choices and
detailed documentation of Task 3.2 work projection and analysis.
Task 3.2 - Preliminary site characterization. Working with final criteria established by
NASA and site-investigator personnel, characterize the sites selected during Task 3.1. Base char-
acterization on cost of feasible trajectories, topography, geology, siesmic stability, other geophys-
ics, geography, overflight safety, geological (structural and petrological) and engineering tunneling
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characterization and costs, detailed environmental feasibility, detailed diurnal and seasonal weath-
erand climate characterization, delineation of land access, ownership, aquisition and costs. Identify
and describe methodology for excavation and/or boring tunnels and establishing support facilities.
Consider launch vehicle exaust management and weather protection for tunnel entrance and exit.
Prepare report for Task 3.B for NASA. This task represents the preliminary characterization to select
the final one or two sites. Comprehensive characterization of the final sites follows this task.
Estimated time required: one year
Participants: PI and technical staff full time, tunnel/excavation expert 1/3 time, geo-
physical services 1/6 time, drilling rig and crew 1/4 time, petrological laboratory
services, engineering rock analysis services, construction engineer, full time.
Deliverables for Task 3.2: Comprehensive final report on character of final sites with
recommendations
Phase 4 - Final Site Characterization:
Task 4.1 - This task shall be a comprehensive review of sites and site selection data by
NASA, assisted by PI and construction engineers, with the final selection of a site for MagLifter.
Task 4.2 - This is the comprehensive geological, engineering, and environmental site char-
acterization of the final selected site. This task is the major characterization and engineering testing
task, with extensive drilling with coring, and extensive materials analysis and engineering studies.
This phase incorporates drilling approximatesy every 50 to 100 feet at critical areas of the site, and
detailed mapping and analysis of geologic, soil, topographic, mineral, vegetation, weather, wildlife,
and other environmental features of the site and its environs.
A separate task incorporates the comphrehensive demographic, economic and political and other
necessary studies of the area surrounding the site.
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SESSION 1: CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES & RESEARCH ISSUES
Capt. Mitchell Clapp, USAF Phillips Laboratory
DR. BLOW: My name is Larry Blow. I'm from a small consulting firm called
Strategic Insights. I have two things to say. That's my real name, and I am
standing up. Now, with no further ado, we'll start off with our first panel. Capt.
Mitch Clapp is going to talk about some of the issues in critical Technologies,
and if we can, let's try to keep it to a half hour per session, so that we can keep
on time and head towards the afternoon. If there's time and if we ask questions,
that's great, but we'll try to keep everyone to a half hour timetable.
CAPT. CLAPP: Well, Gen. Beer told me to come in and sit down at that table, so
I did that. I've always been very attentive to the requests of general officers and
former general officers, ever since something happened to me when I was a
Second Lieutenant. I had a three-hour layover in the St. Louis airport, so I
bought a cup of coffee, a newspaper and a package of Oreos. Sitting down at
the snack bar and there was no room, so the only open spot was across from
this Marine Corps Brigadier General who had no hair, no neck and a silver star
twice, so having put my stuff on the table, I was already committed to the
engagement. What happened was, I had a cup of coffee here, the newspaper
over here and a package of Oreos in the center. I was working on a crossword
puzzle, trying not to bother the guy when I hear this crinkly-crinkly sound and I
look up, and the General has opened up the Oreos, took one out and ate it
without saying a word to me. Now, at airport prices, the nine bucks that a
package of Oreos cost is a significant fraction of a lieutenant's pay. I didn't want
the Marines to think that we Air Force Second Lieutenants were complete
weenies, so I thought I would show the Marine with subtlety and finesse that they
were my Oreos and not his, so I opened the opposite end of the package,
pretending not to notice that the first end had seriously popped opened
somehow, and took an Oreo out and ate it very thoroughly. Now, the Marines
are known for many qualities, but subtlety and finesse are not among them, so
the General took another cookie, and this time he opened it up and licked out of
the middle of the Oreo, and I didn't want to bother him or say anything, because
the moment had kind of passed like, "Excuse me, sir, I couldn't help but noticing,
you appear to be stealing my cookies," and not being an Academy man, I didn't
go to the right class where they teach you how to deal with precisely this kind of
situation. So I took another cookie myself and we all did, went through the whole
package of cookies, never spoke, eyes never met except for maybe the barest
instant, and there was this palpable tension in the air, and finally, and I'm writing
down any old letter in the crossword puzzle, they finally announced the General's
flight, so he gets up. He puts his important-looking papers back in his important-
looking briefcase. He draws himself up with his full nine foot two and takes the
Oreo wrapper, throws it away, brushes the crumbs off the table and leaves, and
that's it. My God, this is the most embarrassing moment in my life, right here,
right now, because I let this guy intimidate me, just by physical presence, out of
probably 3 or 4 percent of my base pay as a Second Lieutenant. But I felt worse
about ten minutes later when they announced my flight. I picked up my coffee,
drank the last of it, threw the cup away and pulled up my newspaper to reveal my
Oreos. No kidding. This really happened. They said I had to have a joke, so
that was my joke.
DR. BLOW: Before we start, I just have one remark, those of us we were talking
earlier, I want to mention to the group, we have a court stenographer down in
front, her name is Melodie, and she's trying to keep up with everything we say,
so first of all, if you do ask a question of the session leaders, please identify
yourself, if for no other reason than just to give your name, so we can trace the
designation of the questions after the fact.
CAPT. CLAPP: And her name is Beer, B-e-e-r. Our breakout session was
charged with talking about and understanding to some degree the critical
technologies and issues involved with the MagLifter concept, and we had a very
eclectic group of people, some folks that knew a thing or two about magneticism,
some people that knew a thing or at least claimed to know a thing or two about
launch vehicles, and while it might not excel in any of the technical issues,
obviously not appropriate to a session of this size and duration, we did identify a
few things that probably need to be considered in the Phase 1 effort that the
MagLifter Research Consortium will get underway, and I'd like to talk about
those.
BREAKOUT SESSION 1
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
WHAT IS "IT?"
WILL IT WORK?
HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?.
HOW DO WE GET FROM HERE?
(...AND EMBELLISH THE CONCEPT ONCE WE GET GOING)
First of all, we needed to identify requirements, you know, what is it? You know,
what's the baseline that we're departing from? What we did is we went to the
business plan, the mini business plan that was in our handouts, and decided that
what we were going to focus around was the 5,000 pounds of pull or payload.
Will it work? And the answer to that is, yes, but with a lot of effort, and there's a
lot of disagreement about exactly how much effort and where it needs to be
applied. How much will it cost? We have, basically, no idea, but we do have
some suggestions about things that will help minimize the cost and strategies to
trade things against one other, and how do we get there from here and embellish
the concept once we get going, and we have a few things to say on that, too, so
that's what I'm going to tell you. I'll come back to this identical saga I told you
already, just like they taught me sometime before the Oreo incident.
MAGLIFTER CONSTRAINTS
'IBIG" SCALE -- 700K #
APPROXIMATELY 500,000 # GLOW
O
O
O
O
MORE CHALLENGING INFRASTRUCTURE
MORE CNIL ENGINEERING
MAYBE LEVERAGE X-33 INVESTMENT,
PROGRAMMATICS
UPGRADE PATH TO BIGGER VEHICLES
We decided that the baseline vehicle was a pure rocket plane, which was
accelerated to some subsonic, but not very subsonic Mach number by the
magnetically elevated device and magnetically driven device. The scale for
putting the 5,000 pound payload in orbit means that the flight itself is going to
weigh of the order of half a million pounds GLOW. That's weight at engine
ignition, if you like. That gives you approximately 50,000 pounds plus or minus
three delta v injected into your reference orbit, of which perhaps 10 percent is
payload. Now, that's an interesting size for a number of reasons, but it's big
because when you consider the weight of the carrier, or the trolley or the shuttle
or the accelerator, whatever you call the thing the vehicle sits on, you're talking
about accelerating mass of about 700,000 pounds, which has some implications
for the infrastructure investment that needs to be made. It's probably more
challenging, especially for the amount of power that needs to be applied to
accelerate the vehicle. There certainly is a lot more civil engineering involved,
and I'm sure the civil engineering related group, the construction people will want
to address that. We didn't have any person working on that in the people in our
group, so we kind of punted that to you all. But there's some upsides to it, too,
that's our happy faces here. One, is that the scale of this vehicle at about a half
a million pounds GLOW is the approximate scale of the X-33 that is currently
under development. All the contractors seem to be within that ballpark for the X-
33 vehicles, and it gives us potentially an opportunity to leverage some of that
investment. We talked a little bit about the technology challenges, and just
taking the X-33 stock, slapping it on the sled, filling it up with liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen and firing the thing in space, and for a lot of technical reasons, that
probably won't work, but the idea is that of that scale, the material, the
technologies and so forth developed for that purpose may have a lot of
transferability, and the point is, that there are significant investments being made
right now in the NASA program for reusable launch vehicles are germane to the
vehicle side of the MagLifter flight system. Is there a question hanging out
there?
MR. HENNESSEY: Yes, Mike Hennessey. You already mentioned delta v. I
guess what I'm concerned about is they're starting from ground zero. They're
starting from flat on the ground with the X-33. Why does your vehicle weigh the
same amount theirs does?
CAPT. CLAPP: Because our vehicle --
MR. HENNESSEY: Because they've got propellant and they've got a lot of
vehicle weight associated with just getting to 600 miles an hour at 20,000 feet.
CAPT. CLAPP: The answer is that the X-33 vehicles are these research
vehicles, which have no payload and no mission other than to accumulate
knowledge, have no payload to orbit, and what MagLifter gets you is the ability to
take a payloadless vehicle that maybe doesn't quite achieve orbit, and actually
make a vehicle of that scale a payload-delivering machine. In other words, the
payload leverage is infinite.
MR. HENNESSEY: I was mistaken. I thought the X-33 did have initial payload
for orbit requirements.
CAPT. CLAPP: No, no, not at all. In fact, that's specifically restricted from the X-
33, because it tends to operationalize what should be a research system. It's not
X-ness, if you want to use a hideous term to describe a hideous reality.
5,000 # PAYLOAD
$
INFRASTRUCTURE
VEHICLE
SCALE
Okay. Another thing is, that if you do bite the bullet and build something this big,
then using advanced vehicle technologies gives you the potential to upgrade
your half a million GLOW vehicle to a payload delivery machine for payloads
greater than 5,000 pounds. Dr. Siebenhaar from Aerojet spoke at some length
about rocket based combined cycle engine that offers the potential to make the
payload fraction of that gross liftoff weight rise from 1 percent to perhaps 4
percent, and what that means is that with this infrastructure investment for sort of
minimal conceptually simple vehicle, you have an upgrade path to a 20,000
pound payload, which is right about where John Mankins is talking about for the
highly reusable space transportation scheme and the presumed economies of
scale. That's the thought from his mouth that he presented yesterday, so there's
potential leverage. And, again, the idea is that there are investments being
made in vehicle technologies in the context of the X-33 programs and other
programs that have to do with space access. That doesn't mean that you can
just take an X-33 and drop it on this thing, obviously, there are technical issues
that would prevent that from being a real smart thing to do. This is a little
controversial, and the group doesn't entirely agree on this, but the idea is that the
investment required to make the MagLifter vehicle, excuse me, the MagLifter
infrastructure bigger, rises as the scale rises. If you're going to move a million
pounds, it's a bigger machine. There's a lot of infrastructure. At some point the
amount of power required means that you might prefer more advanced
technologies for doing the power management, the energy storage and so forth,
depending on what the relative costs and investment required to get there is. To
beat-up the vehicle weight to make the vehicle smaller requires, again, the
application of more advanced technologies. If you have a specific payload
requirement of 5,000 pounds and you want the vehicle to reduce itself in gross
weight, there are advanced technologies investment required to make that
happen, so at some point the investments balance between MagLifter
infrastructure, the electromagnetic portion of the system on one side, and the
vehicle design on the other side trade-off, and there is plausibly an optimum
point, depending on the technology mix and so forth to do it, and I think that an
objective of the first study that you do with your transfer of money in the
MagLifter Research Consortium should be to isolate what that point is, or at least
what ballpark it lies under, at least what state or continent or geographical
region. Now, I'm not probably going to get to that today, but -- So here is a short
list in no particular order of our conclusions.
• O.V. HAS PAYLOAD 1 - 4 % OF GLOW
NEED TO UNDERSTAND VEHICLE DESIGN
• MAGLIFTER- MAGDRIVER
ISOLATE DIFFERENCES
• TECHNOLOGY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE (SCALE)
INFRASTRUCTURE/VEHICLE INTERACTIONS CRITICAL
• PROGRAMMATIC INTERACTIONS
• PICK THE RIGHT SIZE
• SUBSYSTEM RISK MUST BE EVALUATED / DEMONSTRATED
The first is that the orbital vehicle has payload between 1 and 4 percent of its
gross lift-off or light-off weight, if you like, and we need to understand the vehicle
design issues better. For example, using advanced propulsion technology may
allow you to use more conventional structural technologies permitting the
structural design of the vehicle to be less expensive and it could be that applying
the advanced propulsion technology is a net win, that it's actually less expensive
to build a 4 percent GLOW vehicle than a 1 percent GLOW vehicle, assuming
the rabbit does come out of the hat on the propulsion technology. There is a
distinction in the electromagnetic side of the thing between MagLifter and
MagDriver. The lifting part, the suspension part is a different problem
technologically speaking from the acceleration part, and there are scale effects in
that. The lift thing is relatively insensitive to scale and the drive thing begins to
matter in terms of the investment requirement.
MR. CASSETTI: Isn't it more correct that it should be MagLev as opposed to
MagLift?
CAPT. CLAPP: Well, you know, lift is against the gravity factor. Drive is the
other direction. Again, you know, this is scroll, a piece of butcher paper, prefer
whatever terminology you like, but, the point is that the suspension and the
acceleration are different tasks. You use many of the same technologies to
achieve them both. Obviously, we have application of high temperature, or
excuse me, of high current, high magnetic fields, things like that are involved in
both cases. The technology for infrastructure may be a function of scale. It's
clear that you can do things with a magnetic launcher that you can't do with a
magnetic railway, because of the transient nature of its operation, you can let
yourself on the hook for some of the durability issues, some of the power storage
issues. You don't have to run cars at 20 second headway, you can, you know,
cryogenically cool aluminum composite, for example, to achieve temporary
pseudo-superconductivity. It's not technically superconductivity, but it gets you
the same kind of magnetic effects over a short span of time possibly sufficient to
perform the mission. So there are infrastructure and vehicle interactions that are
critical, and that needs to be studied. You can't isolate the vehicle from the
MagLifter electromagnetic system, and that's an important point. And finally, or
semi-finally, there are programmatic interactions, and this is part of the external,
nontechnical context of the whole debate. Clearly, there are applications to high
speed rail transport, medical imaging technology, the existence of the X-33
program, the leveraged vehicle investment, you know, in a perfectly neutral
world, it's not clear what the mix of investment on the vehicle side versus the
MagLifter side itself, the electromagnetic side is, but given that investments are
already being made in vehicle technologies, it allows you to maybe concentrate
resources to some degree on the magnetic suspension side of things.
Pick the right size. You can do an advanced technology vehicle that perhaps
only weighs as much as 200,000 pounds with the carrier device that moves
down the track, but if you do that, you may be at the end of the road, and have to
do an entirely new track and infrastructure investment to support a 20,000
payload mission if that materializes, so understanding the market is a key point.
And there is risk in all of the subsystems involved with this, and these need to be
evaluated and to some degree demonstrated, experimental in an X-like program
to isolate and identify what the technological risks are with all these things. That,
I believe, is everything I had to say. We talked about what it was. We talked
about the various techniques to make it work. The raft of capabilities that can
help. I have some packages that people in our group briefed that I can pass on
to you that you can incorporate into the proceedings, and we don't really know
how much it will cost, but we know to start that some of the right questions to
ask, to start finding out how much it will cost and who in the external world can
help, especially in terms of vehicle investment, and we need to study how to get
there from here. We need to do more study. Okay. That's all I have to say with
my chairman of the breakout session hat on. Please, feel free to ask any
questions and members of the group, please feel free to dissent from anything
I've just said, because we were by no means of one mind about this. I don't
want to unfairly present just one guy's opinion, or be misleading.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Your last point was about demonstrating capability, and
you talked about the test program. Did you discuss where you would do it and
how you would do it?
CAPT. CLAPP: No, we didn't get into that level of detail about how to set out the
scope of the right test program. It seems -- I think there was a sense among
some of the members of the group, that a lot of the technological interaction
issues that I spoke of in earlier conclusions needed to be settled before you can
intelligently scope a test program. That wasn't explicitly stated, I think I kind of
saw that flop over people's heads.
LT. COL. JOSLIN: Randy Joslin here for the Space Command. Did you talk
about the mix of technology investment, government versus -- I know you
indicated that you didn't really know how much it would cost, but in terrns of just
focusing on technologies, not the whole program, but the technology
investments, is there a right mix of Air Force, NASA and private industry
technologies investment in those critical technologies that you discussed?
CAPT. CLAPP: We were having a hard enough time deciding what the critical
technologies were, and so, no, to answer your question, we did not address the
relevant balance between government and private and NASA investment at this
phase.
DR. BEER: Okay. Mitch, we have a four and a half year time line in the mini-
business plan, and our godfather, John Mankins, says that's a very fast-paced
program. In order to make it a 'slow-paced' four and a half years, we need soon,
like now, to pick a final configuration of what MagLifter will look like. We need to
freeze it. Determine the configuration and freeze it, and accept no changes to it
until after the year 2,000. If that were the charter of your breakout group, that is,
to select a configuration to keep it simple, to take advantage of the technologies
available and so on, if that had been what you were asked to do for that two and
a half hours, could you have gotten there?
CAPT. CLAPP: I don't know, sir. I think that we probably would have, based on
my sense of the discussion that went around the room, come up with something
like the baseline that I briefed, which is to say, a pure rocket vehicle with
approximately half a million pounds of gross light-off weight that adds 5,000
pounds to load orbit and payload ample for Teledesic, as described in your
business plan, requiring certain trades to be made in terms of the
electromagnetic technologies required to accelerate that thing, and just bite-off
the investment needed to make that happen. At the same time, though, in a
well-run program like that, you'd probably want to have some technologies
investment on the side to do things like look at alternative vehicle technologies to
improve and augment and embellish the fundamental quality of the vehicle,
increase its payload and so forth. But if you get 500,000 pounds moving down
the sled, you can do an awful lot, and that's fairly difficult to do, but that's
probably a factor of five larger than what the people with the magnetic lifter
training experience regard as state of the art. Is that it, approximately, right, a
factor of 5X?
DR. BEER: That's not far off.
CAPT. CLAPP: Okay. So there's a bit of a leap there, you know, it's not 2X in
magnitude. Anything else? Well, thank you very much, and I have nothing more
to say.
DR. BLOW: Thank you, Mitch.


SESSION 2: DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION
Chair: Joe Haney, Rockwell
DR. BLOW: The next session will be led by Joe Haney from Rockwell, and he's
going to be talking about some of the development and integration issues.
MR. HANEY: What we looked at was that we've got to now build this thing within
schedule and the cost. Do we think we can do that? I'm not going to tell you the
answer yet, but I'm going to put up a couple of charts just to set the stage that I
did with the group, and I'm not going to go through all the agonizing processing,
but there is a process that we would have to go through to develop an integrated
system.
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
MARKET: DRNING SCHEDULE & RISK
PROTOTYPE: OBJECTIVES
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS: YET TO BE DEFINED
TUNNEL: SCHEDULE, MAINTENANCE, LOCATION, GROWTH
FLIGHT VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT: SYSTEM INTEGRATION &
COST
And we looked at that and we got hung up on a couple of things. The first being
who is the user and what are the requirements? And rm going to talk about that
a little bit more, and how we think that's driving schedule and risk. Requirements
definition, what are they, and in that case there were a lot of TBDs. What are
you going to build to? Scheduling and milestones, we didn't really touch on.
Design options and trade, we talked about a few of those. Now I'll come back to
those. Technology assessment was just discussed, but ostensibly to meet the
schedule the technology has to exist today to meet the schedule in the business
plan. Then developing the design, how do you reduce the risk, and then we
talked quite a bit about the prototype system. One of the things that I struggled
with and the group struggled with is if you look at the systems, and really there
are four basic systems as a part of the overall infrastructure, but just to put up
the guideway, the issues associated with the guideway, what's the guideway
look like? What's its shape? How long is it? How wide is it? How high is it?
How is it made? What materials? How's it fabricated? How is it installed?
What's the propulsion concept? What's the magnetic levitation concept? All of
those things you've got to establish in the beginning so that you can then go and
try to cost the system and put the system together. Whatever you do, this
system has to be integrated, you know, the guideway, the carrier vehicle, the
launch vehicle and the power system all have to be integrated. It's not going to
be the optimum guideway with the optimum carrier vehicle with the optimum
power system, and so, therefore, because it's a systems integration task, it may
require a little longer time than is currently in the scheduling.
MARKET
• ONE NEAR TERM CUSTOMER DRIVES PROGRAM SCHEDULE
& RISK
• CUSTOMER WANTS RELIABILITY AS WELL AS LOW COST!
• WILL CUSTOMER PUT 1OO% OF BUSINESS IN ONE
SYSTEM?
• DOES THIS DRIVE TWO LAUNCH SYSTEMS?
• IS THERE BENEFIT IN ADDRESSING NON-LAUNCH
TECH NO LOGY?
• ADDRESS POST RLV TARGETS
• PAYLOAD COMPATABILITY WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
The first activity that we really looked at was trying to look at the user, and what
we thought that was doing to the development and integration, and this may not
be correct, but this is our perception of what the reality is. It appears that the
schedule is being driven by the main user, which in this case is Teledesic. If you
look at the model, and when we do that, that drives the overall program
schedule, and by driving the schedule, compressing the schedule, that drives the
risk, and so if we add risk into it, then we go to the user and he says, "Gee, I
don't know if I want this system. It's got a lot of risk in it," I have to look at
alternative launch approaches. Would you get 100 percent, or would you get a
high percentage of his business if he thought you were a high risk system? And
so then that drove us to ask if we need two launch systems? One of the things
that the user wants is low cost and high reliability. Do we have to have two
launch systems, or how do we demonstrate to the user that we are a low-cost,
reliable, risk-free or an appropriate risk-taking system? The other idea that we
came up with is maybe we need another user, who is a nonlaunch user. Maybe
the technology that's coming out of this, especially when we get the financing,
would be supported by other users of the MagLift technology. And when we
looked at that, we came to the sort of conclusion, I guess you would say, that
asks are we being, by addressing a very near term market, are we creating a risk
in the system that would cause that near term customer not to want our system?
And so that was a predicament that we were in. So one of the alternatives would
be maybe we would look at a further downstream user to do that. The other
thing is because we're going to be in most people's eyes, a near term or a high-
risk system, we can't impose any payload requirements that are going to be
unique to our system, because if they want to have a backup system, they don't
want to design a payload that only works on this system, but works on a number
of systems, so we're going to have to in doing this, make our system compatible
with other launch systems relative to payload interfaces. We looked at the
schedule in the first six months and due to the feasibility or hopefully out of the
feasibility would come some of the requirements, and some of the approaches
and maybe some of the trade studies.
PROTOTYPE SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTOTYPE
TECH DEMO vs VALUE-ADDED OPS SYSTEM
COST, SCHEDULE, RISK
uSCALABILIT_'
DEMO "FORCING FUNCTIONS"
-- WHAT IS THE DRIVER?.
What we looked at next was the prototype system, which in the business plan is
about a year long, and if we look at that, the first questions that we came up with
are, what are the requirements for the prototype system? Normally your
prototype system is to help you over some of the risk reductions and allow you
some understanding before you go to the full system, but as far as what those
requirements are for the prototype, we didn't have all the answers and we don't
think those have been really resolved yet, and what it really got into is whether
the purpose of the prototype system to demonstrate technology. In other words,
what are the critical technologies in a MagLifter? Is it demonstrating magnetic
levitation? Is it demonstrating magnetic propulsion? Is it linking those together
with a carrier vehicle and showing you moving it down the track? Is it getting to a
certain speed? Is it being able to separate from that carrier vehicle? And what
are all those technology things, or do you want to combine all of those into a
prototype system that provides added value, so that when you're all done you
say, hey, we've got this prototype system and guess what it does? It puts very
small payloads, 50 pound payloads or so into low earth orbit, and therefore,
here's a benefit you got from the prototype. Now here's an operational use,
which I'll come to later, what that really impacts. But if you look at that, if you
look at designing, fabricating and installing and testing a prototype system, that
is a system, I don't believe that can be done in one year regardless of the dollar
amount. I just don't believe that can be done. The other issues are scalability. If
this is a 700,000 pound or 500,000 pound vehicle, how small can a prototype be
to demonstrate the technologies for that system? And I think rve already
covered the forcing function, but what's the driver? What's the success criteria
from the demonstrator? What that resulted in is if you're looking at a system that
demonstrates technology, that would be maybe one location. In other words,
maybe I could do that at Holloman. Maybe I could do all the levitation,
propulsion and maybe even separation in putting a system into White Sands into
the 60 or 70 miles that you've got there. However, if I'm going with a system that
develops into a mini maybe money-making system, then I get to another
location. I probably can't put that there, because we were thinking about, well,
maybe what you do is you use a solid rocket, well, I'm going to have stages that
fall off. I probably don't want those falling on Albuquerque or El Paso, whichever
way I go, and so that says maybe I can't put it in the southwest, maybe I have to
put it on the Coast, and we were all voting for Hawaii. We were looking for a tour
of duty there. We figured that probably would work, maybe with an increase in
pay to cover the added costs.
RESULT
• DEMO LOCATION
• PARTS vs TOTAL SYSTEM
• COST, SCHEDULE
• WHO & WHY FUND DEMO
-- DEMO vs SYSTEM FINANCING MAY BE DIFFERENT
Then we got down to that part versus a total system test. The other part would
be a prototype that maybe was a different funding agency than the overall
system, or maybe we can get an additional funding source to fund this prototype
demo, because it may have added values to a whole wide-range of magnetic
levitations as opposed to just the orbital system.
WHAT TO DEMO?
• TUNNEL vs NOT
• DESIGN, SCHEDULE, COST
• COMPONENT vs SYSTEM
• USES OF PROTOTYPE
• SUCCESS CRITERIA
One of the other issues, or some of the things that came up is, what do you need
to demo? If you're going to have a tunnel, do you need to demonstrate that in
the prototype system? Obviously, you don't need to demonstrate that you could
build a tunnel, but do you need to demonstrate that this vehicle goes through the
tunnel with all the aerodynamic forces and so forth, and that really gets into the
schedule, the cost issues. We personally were against a tunnel through a
mountain, and I'll cover that in a little bit. When you do a demo or prototype, you
want to declare success, and so part of that would be setting that prototype up
so that it was successful. It wasn't something that you didn't have a chance in
achieving and that got back to scheduling cost. We looked at a number of --
trying to understand, we did not resolve any issues, raised issues.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
DESIGN LIFE
PAYLOAD
EVOLUTIONARY vs REVOLUTIONARY
RMA
FAILURE ISSUES: BACKUP APPROACH
And relative to systems requirements, one of the issues in developing and
designing something is what's the life? How long should this survive? Should
the guideway be designed for 20 years, ten years, 50 years, and how much
reusability do you want to put in the system? We chose the 5,000 pound
payload, that was in the business spec, but then there's a lot of other
requirements that go with that. Payload, that would drive the design. We didn't
know, and this would need to be defined. The other approach would be, do we
want this to be, obviously, a magnetic lift system is revolutionary, but do you
want to, in the context of developing the MagLev system, make something that's
evolutionary, that allows you to grow with time, and so maybe you don't start off
with it. Maybe you find out a way to do it under 700,000 pounds, allow us to
grow into that. If you do that, then it says you've got to build the guideway in the
ultimate case, so maybe the vehicle doesn't get there. We've got to consider
reliability, maintainability, availability of all the parts, and we just were unable to
address that, and then what -- you know, you may have a failure with any new
system, and so what's the backup approach? And that got us into thinking, if you
got this in a tunnel and it fails in a tunnel, what does that mean? One of the
most likely scenarios for failure is because it's magnetically levitated, you're
going high speed and you've got small gaps. What happens if you kiss the side
of the guideway? What does that do to you, or should you design to be able to
do that at certain speeds, and because you have to have a backup approach
that says, do you need another launch system or what, whatever, another
guideway? Sort of summarizing, but not yet to my summary, it looked like, from
our opinion, that the market we chose was driving the program, and that may be
just a reality of life. To get funding, you've got to pick a market or a user and
force it to fit in there. But you don't want to pick something that you don't have a
chance at achieving and you don't want to start off on something that you know
will fail, so that was the concern and we think we need to go back and look at
that and address that.
For the prototype, we need to really say what are the objectives of the
prototype? What do we want to get out of that prototype system? Because the
prototype is probably going to be what is the next stepping stone that gives you
more funding, so we need to carefully understand the prototype. We need to get
the system's requirements defined, so that you can go cost the system, size the
system and make a somewhat better estimate on the scheduling of the cost. We
looked at the tunnel. We sort of shied away from drilling a tunnel through the
side of a mountain for a number of reasons. One, we might not meet a
schedule. How fast can you tunnel at 10,000 feet or whatever you're going to
tunnel? The fact that the geology, the rocks are not consistent as you go
through that, and that it may be availability to get to the track, that if you did a
groove in the side of the mountain and then encased that to get away from the
environmental, you may have a better maintainability and operability aspect.
Also, if you had a failure, maybe just blow off those panels and that would relieve
the pressure as opposed to having a major explosion in the tunnel. From the
overall flight vehicle development and systems integration or the whole system,
we feel that we need to really go back and look at the overall schedules on that.
There are a number of trades. There's a whole series of trades that I think we
need to look at from the very basic, of what should be the exit velocity? Should it
be subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic? How do you trade weight versus speed
and payload? Should it be a manned or unmanned system? And then that has
a lot of connotations not only with the cost, but with how you build it. If we would
summarize, I think the basic schedule appears to be user driven, and that tends
to result in a schedule, especially the prototype schedule that appears to be too
optimistic. I said once before that in that one year, you've got to design it, so that
you can fabricate it, so you can install it, and so you can test it, and the best any
systems have done is around two years for flight vehicles and that did not have
all the system integration issues here. We need to spend some more time
defining the systems requirements for the various component levels. The basic,
I believe that the basic concept of MagLifter is feasible. I don't have any problem
with it being an unfeasible system, but I think we need to understand what the
technology readiness is and how that relates to risk and how that develops into
building an overall schedule. And so, therefore, I think we need to take another
look at the plan, to sit down and lay out some other schedules. We looked at the
cost and we had some discussion on the cost, but I don't think we have a
consensus about the cost. I do think we have a consensus on the schedules,
especially the prototype being requested. And that's all I've got. Any questions?
Be happy to dance around the answer. Yes?
DR. HUMBLE: Ron Humble. You said you didn't have a consensus on the cost.
Did you have a consensus on the range of cost?
MR. HANEY: The reason we didn't have a consensus on the cost is we looked
at it and people voiced their opinion that maybe the cost was too low, but we
really didn't discuss it, so we don't have a consensus, because I just don't think
we discussed it enough. Would you agree, Pam, that it was just sort of, we
looked at it, people made comments but we really didn't discuss it.
MR. CASSETTI: I don't think there was anybody in our group that thought it
could be done for the cost. I think we were skeptical.
MR. HANEY: The cost was very aggressive. I think you can do a prototype
system. You don't need $2 billion to do a prototype system. You may be able to
do a prototype system, in fact, I would probably say you could do a prototype
system for $150 million, but you've got to pick one of the right prototype systems.
$150 million is a lot of dollars in anybody's book.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Gary Rodriguez. If we're going to use the tunnel in some
form and we want to evaluate that, does it make sense then in the prototype
stage to maybe stick it inside a pipe if we don't want to go dig a tunnel for that?
MR. HANEY: Well, it gets back to scalability. How big is your prototype and do
you need to -- you know, the other approach to prototype testing is, do you have
to do the whole system or can you break it up into component tests and still
demonstrate that? So you might be able to do the tunnel in a smaller subscale,
and some of the other components would be larger scale. Is that it? Oh, I knew
you had one.
DR. BEER: Neil Beer. Now, Joe, the prototype development test was 12
months, and that's fairly short, but I didn't have in mind any kind of a full-up, full-
scale release, launch, separation. I really had in mind what you had on that
chart, which is a technology prototype kind of demo.
MR. HANEY: Okay. But even with that, let's look at that. Let's say, what are we
going to demonstrate? Definitely going to have to demonstrate magnetic
levitation along with propulsion. Probably one of the critical elements is once
you've got this thing zipping down a track, you've got to separate it. And so then
it gets into scale, and how complex do you want to be, and how fast do you want
to go with your prototype and that dictates how long your track should be. One
of the things that we talked about maybe as a prototype approach, would be to
take the Holloman track. It's got three legs. You take the high speed leg, which
doesn't get used as much, and you put a guideway over that, because now your
foundation is, you don't have to worry about developing a foundation, it's already
there, it's already straight, and then all you have to do is build the carrier vehicle
to go over that. You could maybe separate the, just as Holloman is doing,
separate the magnetic propulsion from the levitation, and do it in certain steps or
stages, but I think we really need to sit down and say, "What do we want to get
out of the prototype system? What's the purpose of the prototype?" You know,
if the purpose of the prototype is to go to a funding source and say, "Hey, we
want you to contribute several hundred million dollars and you should give us
that and have confidence that we can build this system because we've done this
prototype," then that sort of puts us in the situation of saying, "If I was going to
give you some money, what would I want that prototype to do?" And I think
we've got to go through that thought process, and understand that and say, "Can
that be done in a year?" For the prototype myself personally, I don't think that
the dollar amount is in question for me. You want to give me a $150 million, I'll
go prototype something.
DR. BEER: I really don't see any need to have anything but a dummy load. It
really is the magnetic levitation and propulsion and that can carry the kind of
gross weights that Mitch Clapp was talking about. I mean, I think that is the
prototype demo. I see nothing risky, you know, about the release from the
MagLifter carrier vehicle of the booster vehicle and the light-off and so on. I
mean, I hadn't even thought about the booster vehicle being available that soon.
I guess we could define a candidate to put on the prototype demo, but I don't see
why that would be of interest.
MR. HANEY: Well, I think, you know, even subsonic separating vehicles at high
speed is going to be a challenge, because you want them to separate at the right
time. Especially if you're in a tunnel, you're probably going to have the engines
going before you leave the tunnel to make sure that everything is operating, so I
DR. BEER: That's like prototyping an operational, semi-operational system that
you're describing and why would one need to go that far?
MR. HANEY: Don't really know. I mean, that's why I think we need to
understand what we're getting out of the prototype. What are the requirements
for the prototype? And that really drives the financial customer. You know, if
you went to a bank and said, "Hey, I want you to give me this money. What's
your requirement to give me that money? What do I have to demonstrate before
you'll give me the money?"
DR. BEER: Right.
MR. HANEY: And we were guessing that they would want a significant
demonstration. Whereas, the component stuff maybe NASA or the Air Force
would be willing to fund the components. Yes?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Gary Rodriguez again. Is it possible that this prototype
might be partitioned instead of having one large $150 million prototype, in fact,
break up pieces of this and work with the MagLift part of it and Mag accelerator
part of it, et cetera, as discrete, different efforts?
MR. HANEY: Yes, I think there would be component tests, sure, even if your
goal was to build a full system, you're going to have component tests that tell you
your prototype is going to be successful, too.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: But what I'm suggesting is that by definition, the prototype is
going to be not necessarily full to ignition.
MR. HANEY: Go ahead.
MR. CASSETTI: Marlowe Cassetti. We were told in our session that MagLev
and MagPush have already been developed. To go do a prototype for that really
doesn't make a lot of sense, it's already been demonstrated. Putting a rocket on
top of a carriage that is being pushed, levitated and pushed magnetically has not
been done, and that's where we got into this thinking about demonstrating the
separation of the rocket from the cradle, and then, gee, wouldn't it be nice to take
maybe a separating rocket and give it enough delta v so it's got the capability of
pushing something into orbit. That's kind of-- there was a thought process
there, that kind of goes back to some of the testing we did on Delta Clipper
where people said, "Isn't there something that you could push off that thing to get
something in orbit to do just more than take off and land?"
MR. RODRIGUEZ: But, Marlowe, wouldn't you entertain the notion that perhaps
taking a 300 knot MagLift train is, you know, going to -- what we are going to do
with nearly Mach I, that is not necessarily a 2X linear process. There's probably
a lot more involved in making that vertical, that it may not be as state of the art
as we like to think.
MR. CASSETTI: We kind of answered that question by looking at if you've got
some investors out there who want to go invest some money, we want to give
them a good enough reason so that they don't go to jail, like the guy who was
playing hedged bonds in Orange County, because he was being fiscally
irresponsible. We want to give them enough ammunition so they won't go to jail
for taking somebody's money, you know, and pushing it down a rat hole. So
you've got to make a meaningful enough prototype to get people to climb on
board this and feel that they're doing it with an intelligent decision.
MR. HANEY: Either your prototype has to be more complete or your
development schedule has to stretch out, so that in the development schedule,
you allow a prototype development process. In other words, you say, "Okay,
well, I'm going to build a system now and rm not going to go to the full velocity.
I'm going to go to partial velocity. I'm going straight. Now I got to go up a
mountain at an incline." You know, making that turn from level to 45 or 20
degrees magnetically levitated is going to be a challenge.
MR. TURMAN: Bob Turman from Sandia. I agree that the statement that you
made earlier, that magnetic levitation has been demonstrated and magnetic
acceleration has been demonstrated. The two of them together, the combination
that we're seeing here, I don't think has been demonstrated. Certainly not in an
engineering sense. So maybe one approach to this prototyping would be an
incremental prototyping where the first thing I would do is demonstrate the
MagLev for the vehicle and an acceleration of three Gs or on that order. Do that
in a scale of a couple of hundred meters, that's a fairly reasonable vehicle, a
fairly -- maybe a 500 kilograms or something like that, that's a fairly reasonable
scale, and probably the facility, the launcher cost is like $10 million, I would
guess. If we do that first, just demonstrate that you can levitate it, you can
stabilize it, you can accelerate it, that would be a big step beyond what Trans
Rapid does with their teaching of their MagLev vehicles now. The next step then
would be to take that vehicle, put a rocket on it, then use that same launcher with
the rocket stage and use it as a suborbital, then you could use that same test
facility to look at the separation issues. I would do that all outside the tunnel. If
we were successful there, maybe put a big tube around it and look at the
aerodynamics. That's probably three or four steps, and I don't think you could do
it all in one year. I don't think you could, but I would think that would be
discussed.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That represents a reasonable partition, because no
one component, you're not looking at $150 million reach. You're looking at
incremental, ten and 20 pieces.
MR. WOODRING: Mary Woodring, General Atomics. I think just one
observation, if you're going to have to advance a lot of market knowledge,
engineering might be prepared to buy some of the separate tests. The people
that are going to be making investments are probably bankers and accountants
and people with that sort of background, risk-takers, probably. They're going to
need to be convinced that what you've done is sufficiently prototypic of the
system, that they're going to be willing to put up money and risk losing it, so it's
not engineers we're trying to convince, it's the general public or the investment
company.
MS. BURKE: Pam Burke. One of the other things that we have to remember is,
we're trying to convince the people that are going to fly on it, and they're going to
be very risk adverse, I would think, if you came with a new system. If the
prototype or demonstrate system doesn't show them that the system is going to
work and it's capable of flying them, you're not going get passengers. So one of
the things we considered in the group was, if you don't have a prototype or a
demonstration that is significant enough to show the concept, proof of concept,
one, you may not have a market when you're done, and if you don't have a
market, you don't have funding, and so you're not going to have to bother with
the prototype, because you're not going to have anything to do with it. So we do
have to consider that the prototype has to be done to convince a potential
market that this is a usable system and risk-free or risk-lessened.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Another problem with having too large of a chunk is
that you're putting the old eggs in the basket issue. If you have a failure, then
that becomes a big issue, a big problem if it's a bigger piece.
MR. HANEY: Yes, I want to clarify one thing. I don't want to give the wrong
impression, that we thought it had to be a prototype all or nothing type system,
that even the prototype is somewhat evolutionary. It was just a final step of our
prototype, had to be somewhat prototypically, so that people would say, like
Mary said, "1 don't have to say, "Well, gee, you can test this. Here are the
equations that get you from this to a full-sized vehicle,"' that they can visualize
you did that. I believe this will happen, and so that was our basic process,
because we don't believe our funding source is the government. We're not
dealing with engineers and NASA and the Air Force, and that chain of command
that's used to working that way. We're dealing with a different customer. Yes?
MR. de ROCHEMONT: Pierre de Rochemont. A point that Bob Turman
brought up on technology issues, Bob, correct me here if l have misspoken, is
that the Teledesic orbs involved are apparently unstable, and maybe what we
should use in the business plan isn't the installation of Teledesic, but Teledesic,
if those orbs are unstable, would need a highly responsive launch method to
repair holes in the net as the birds drop out of orbit and maybe that's what we
should gear, you know, the financial structure around, and you know, stretch out
the prototyping and look at the market potentials, meaning, I guess, the recent --
MR. HANEY: Which was 60 flights a year.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's in the plan. Some of that's replacement.
MR. de ROCHEMONT: Maybe that's what we should look at. That way, I guess,
we keep all the parties happy. Technologists feel secure with what they have
developed and the user will have a higher level of comfort.
DR. BEER: I'm missing that point. Pierre, would you say that again or say it
differently?
MR. de ROCHEMONT: Right now we're looking at establishing a schedule that
is more aggressive than I think most people feel comfortable with. We like the
prototype system. We like to have a level of assurance that we don't feel can be
met in a time frame to install the Teledesic constellation, but this business
potential, once Teledesic is up there and what we should be looking at in that
case, since we're looking at stretching out the prototype, meaning the installation
of a MagLifter or maybe a blind assist system, is trying to capture the resupply
market to Teledesic rather than the installation parts. We should look at
speaking with Bill Gates of Microsoft, you know, we'll need a follow-up system
that will lower the maintenance cost of their net.
MR. HANEY: See, I think if the system that we set up, to do an analogy, was an
X-31, you could even take the prototype step out. You say, "Okay. Now, we're
going to build an experimental facility and it may or may not pay for itself, but
we're demonstrating the technology, that's one stretch. But what we're trying to
stretch to is an operational system, which has to have much higher reliability
than a classic two year X vehicle program, three year X vehicle program.
MR. de ROCHEMONT: I guess the resupply market is going to have to be very
responsive, I guess, launch in a day, less than a day.
DR. BEER: Just one quick point. Teledesic's plan is that the spares go up, you
know, at the same time, so there's like four spares per orbit, that's like --
MR. de ROCHEMONT: But it may be less expensive to keep them on the
ground --
MR. CASSETTI: Obviously, they can't stand the outage. They can't even stand
a day delayed launch or a few days. They still I think --
DR. BEER: We put something in there for replenishment, I'm not sure what that
number was, maybe we should look at that.
MS. BURKE: We also looked at not only using Teledesic. What we need to
consider is a vehicle that has more than one user, so that -- and prototyping
them would get us into being able to say we've got a series of users, by doing a
good job of maintaining requirement by definition, that's incorporating more than
just a single user driving the whole technology. That reduces the risk.
MR. HANEY: I'm getting the time hook.
DR. BLOW: Yes. Could we hold the questions?
MR. HANEY: I'm going to make one closing comment. I think what we just need
to do, Neil, is go back, look at the schedules, and answer some fundamental
questions, you know, what are we trying to get out of the prototype, who is the
customer, and how much risk should we impose on the customer, and then see
how the schedule comes out, or how much is he willing to take?


SESSION 3: CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING
Chair: Ralph Christie, Merrick & Company
DR. BLOW: The next session is going to be led by Ralph Christie from Merrick.
He will be talking about Construction and Engineering requirements.
MR. CHRISTIE: We're pretty much on schedule, so hopefully, the engineering
and construction group can keep the project on schedule. Our assignment kind
of reminds me of a story a few years back in the Mid East crisis. Gen.
Schwarzkopf was kind of down and out, had a long couple of days. Walking
through the desert, he comes upon this lamp. Sees this lamp and says, "What
have I got to lose?" He picks up the lamp and rubs it and out comes a genie,
and the genie says to Gen. Schwarzkopf, "You've got a wish. What would it be?
Any wish in the world." He said, "1 wish there was peace in the Mid East." She
says, "I'm a pretty good genie, but that's a tough wish. How about a second
wish? .... Okay. I happen to be a Denver Bronco fan, and how about the Denver
Broncos win the Super Bowl?" She says, "Can we go back to that first wish?"
So that is kind of what we were like. We had to step one challenge at a time,
one wish at a time.
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Session 3, Engineering and Construction, just to give you a little perspective of
who was in the group, because I think that was a good cross-section. We had
four engineer architects or constructors represented. Their focus was the
obvious engineering design, construction and operation interface. We had one
government representative. His focus was more on the systems, programmatic
side, the marketing side. One from the educational community. His interest
focus was systems engineering, and offered to do some facility feasibility
support. One mining company, obviously, from the tunneling and geology side.
We feel we had our bases covered there. One geotechnical/environmental firm
addressing those issues, so I believe it was a good cross-section to be looking at
the engineering and construction. We wanted to answer the following four
questions:
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
• TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
• ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY
• PROGRAMMATIC FEASIBILITY
• OPEN ISSUES
I think John Mankins said it best at end of the session this morning, we need to
look at technical feasibility, economic feasibility and programmatic issues, and
also any open issues and what are the next steps, so that's kind of how we
approached it.
We've got two cases. These are the assumptions or the ground rules, if you will.
Case one, we're going to build this thing on bedrock. Fracturing of material in
rock was obviously going to be an issue, so we needed to identify an area where
we can actually mount this thing in bedrock. SMES, we left that to the other
group, is feasible and we assumed that it was furnished -- it's not in our cost. In
a minute we're going to show you engineering and construction costs. It does
not include the SMES. It includes the facilities for the SMES. Many people
talked about the market, but we just went ahead and assumed there is the
market to support full-scale deployment. We just said if we get wrapped up in
thiemarketing discussion, we will never address our issue of what we were
assigned to do. We looked at 5,000 pounds LEO for I think, John, in your case,
we went back and chatted with you briefly, but I think we used the Mach II
vehicle to satisfy this particular case of 5,000 pounds, because when you look at
John's analysis, he's got several vehicles there, not just a Mach II, but a Mach I
and a Mach III, and so forth.
ASSUMPTIONS/GROUND RULES
MARK II VEHICLE (MODIFIED PAYLOAD)
CASE I
BUILT ON BEDROCK
SMES FEASIBLE AND FURNISHED BY OTHERS
A MARKET TO SUPPORT FSD
5,000 LBS LEO
45 50 DEGREES INCLINATION (BALLISTIC)
• REUSABLE VEHICLES
• 10 METER TUNNEL (3 METER VEHICLE)
• DOWN RANGE TRACKING etc. BY OTHERS
This is the case. Case I is 45 to 50 degree inclination, the ballistic one,
reusable vehicles, and a ten-meter tunnel is one of the things we talked about.
The vehicle itself only needs a three-meter diameter tunnel, but because of the
power systems and the maintenance around it, we got four engineers together
and said, "Tell me your thoughts here." Downrange tracking, et cetera by others,
we will have on-range tracking and telemetry support, but obviously siting is
always a question. Depending on where you put this down-range tracking, may
or may not be an issue. May be able to just utilize the Western Test Range or
Eastern Test Range.
ASSUMPTIONS/GROUND RULES
MARK II VEHICLE (MODIFIED PAYLOAD)
CASE II
• 37 METER TUNNEL (30 METER VEHICLE)
(CUT & COVER)
• 20 DEGREE INCLINATION/AERODYNAMIC
• LANDING SITE ADJACENT (< 20 MILES)
Case II is slightly different. It's a larger vehicle. It's a larger tunnel. How do we
get that number? 30 meters to take care of the wing span of the vehicle, and
then seven meters is the same seven meters we used before on the allowance
of around the vehicle for the tunnel. 20 degree inclination. This particular
vehicle is aerodynamic. We believe the landing site needs to be adjacent within
20 miles, and we put that in the cost.
CASES I & II
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
10 METER TUNNEL
- FEASIBLE FOR BORING
- ASSUME GEOLOGY IS ACCEPTABLE
-- IGNEOUS/METAMORPHIC
• HIGH MAINTENANCE ISSUES:
- DEWATERING SYSTEM --1
WALLS MAINTAINED
CORROSION/WEATHERING _
SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE
• SITING: IDENTIFY AREA LESS EARTHQUAKE PRONE
LINING MATERIAL TO SATISFY:
- OVERPRESSURE
- ACOUSTICS
- HEAT
So this is the basis for everything we addressed on the engineering construction
side. It's not rocket science as John said. We can build this, but there are some
issues that need to be evaluated. We need to take a good engineering approach
to it, and then go do it. Ten-meter tunnel for the first case is feasible for boring.
We made the assumptions the geology is acceptable, igneous or metamorphic
rock is preferable, according to our geologist, in order to get to the bedrock type
of material that we want. High maintenance is something that does need to be
looked at, as John indicated, but that the O&M costs cannot be ignored. We've
got to look at total life cycle costs. From a construction standpoint, the best way
to drive this cost down is to look at some dewatering systems, maintaining the
walls looking at the weather and corrosion issues and designing walls for that.
We do have a cost allowance in here for wall containment. We do have
solutions available. We're not suggesting that these are issues as much as
probably should have put considerations. Siting, we identify an area which is not
earthquake prone. Obviously, the higher the probability of earthquake, the
higher the cost, so that's a siting issue. Lining material needs to satisfy
overpressure, acoustics and heating, and we thought Coors would love to look at
that.
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY
CASE I
ENVIRONMENTAL R, SITE INVESTIGATION
TUNNEL (3 MILES)
GUIDSWAY POWER
GUIDEWAY ($1Sm/MILE)
TELEMETRY/ON-RANGE TRACKING
SMES FACILITY, MISSION OPS,
FUELING, CHECKOUT FACILITIES, etc.
AIRDROME, FLIGHT OPS
INFRASTRUCTURE(POWER,ROADS, etc.)
LAND ACQUISITION
SWAG" IN MILLIONS
$40
$400
$1oo
$so
$25
$150
$1o
$50
St so
$1.02S
CASE II
($200 M LESS)
- CUT & COVER vs TUNNEL
- BUSINESS PLAN
$80O
$550
Economic feasibility, there has been a lot of talk about cost. We just went ahead
and took a bold SWAG at it, and you'll note I said SWAG. Environmental and
siting investigations, this is for the whole baby, all the way through to full-scale
deployment, if you will, we put $40 million down, $20 million each. We felt that
these two exercises could not be taken lightly. They're going to be costly. We
tried to put realistic numbers down and that was input again across the board
from engineering companies as well as environmental firms. The tunnel we
assumed was the three-mile tunnel. This is the case, again, where we're actually
going to bore a tunnel. We have got $400 million for that. There was a recent
project that was cited. We used that number on a dollar per mile basis, if you
will. Guideway power, we put $100 million. The guideway itself, $50 million, and
again, the assumption is that the down-range tracking is available. We've got
some on-range stuff and telemetry, for $25 million. Then the group of facilities
that have been mentioned in some of the work that John has done, SMES
facility, mission OPS, fueling facility, checkout facility and so forth, we put $150
million allowance for that. Airdrome and flight OPS, we felt would require $10
million. Infrastructure, which includes power, roads and other necessary utilities
at $50 million. We've got land acquisition allowance in there of $150 million.
Comes out to a nice round number of a billion dollars, slightly above. Case II
would be less, because we're looking at not doing a tunnel, because of the larger
configuration and the inclination, or more of the inclination, I should say, we
could cut and cover versus a tunnel, that gave us $800 million. Just for
comparison, in the business plan we were more in the range of $550 million.
MR. HANEY: Joe Haney. In your cost, your first cost estimate you just had up,
where was your cost estimate for your vehicles going to deliver the payload?
MR. CHRISTIE: The vehicles are not in here. We looked at purely engineering
and construction of the facility and the site. We assumed, and that may be a
false assumption, that one of the other sessions was looking at vehicle
architecture and the cost for the launch vehicle. Yes, sir?
MR. HAYNER: Mike Hayner. When you say airdrome particularly in dollars,
what are you assuming there?
MR. CHRISTIE: The one who came up with that number was Ron.
MR. TORGERSON: That
whatever kind of dynamics,
included with it.
payment, probably the flight operation center,
probably includes the MOA or anything that's
MR. HAYNER: Not even close.
MR. TORGERSON: I don't know.
MR. HAYNER: You're talking for a recoverable vehicle, and for a recoverable
vehicle -- you've got to land on a landing strip.
MR. CHRISTIE: Vertical.
MR. TORGERSON: Vertical.
MR. HAYNER: Vertical landing? DCX like powered flight.
MR. FAERY: Well, that's what the thought was for this.
MR. CHRISTIE: Again, open for discussion.
MR. FAERY: I think you need an airstrip if you're going to get payloads in and
out of there.
MR. CHRISTIE: So $50 million, $100 million?
MR. FAERY: I have no airfield. I know they're a lot.
MR. SULLIVAN: Ron Sullivan. I have a question about the cost of the economic
feasibility, seems like you should add cost of money and taxes. This is a
significantly large amount of investment which is largely capital, which will remain
in the state or the location. They're probably going to tax you, so that --
MR. CHRISTIE: That's a good point. There's no escalation in here. These are
in today's dollars.
MR. SULLIVAN: So a return on investment for the people that are actually
investing in this.
MR. CHRISTIE: Right. We talked about economic feasibility. You're absolutely
correct. We only took it as far as capital cost or nonrecurring cost. We didn't
look at the revenue stream. We didn't look at the amortization of costs and all
those types of things. We just bloody ran out of time.
MR. SULLIVAN: Also, on your facilities, you think your launch base facility, your
speed facility, mission OPS, checkout, et cetera, again, I think that's really
underscoped. That may be using some alternate facility, but even so, depending
on where that's going to be done, I'm assuming it's going to be done up in the
mountains somewhere, you've got to establish an entire base up there.
MR. CHRISTIE: Right.
MR. SULLIVAN: And I don't think you can do that for near $150 million.
MR. CHRISTIE: Well, to address your question or relate it to that, and I didn't
probably mention it in the assumptions, we're assuming this is a commercial
operated type facility.
MR. SULLIVAN: I'm still assuming you've got to put a population of people up
there, you're going to have to have housing for them, some offices for them, food
service, recreation.
MR. CHRISTIE: Right, trailers.
MR. SULLIVAN: And all of the things that have to go along to support an
ongoing day-in and day-out mission. A lot of that, a lot of the commercial
aspects of a campaign thing where you deliver a short-time, launch something
and get out of there, this is a day-in and day-out operation, so you've got to build
infrastructure there that's more than just a couple of hangars, so I think
somebody needs to take a hard look at that.
MR. CHRISTIE: Okay.
MR. SULLIVAN: You look at our current launch bases, they're probably half a
billion to billion dollar investments. A lot of that is needed for this operation. You
ought to know the reason for the various facilities and someone needs to
seriously sit down and look at that.
MR. CHRISTIE: One thing we looked at was the cost of some recent launch
comp!exes that have been built, and if you pare back the MST and the launch
complex itself, and look at all the support infrastructure around it, we kind of
looked at it that way. That the bulk of that cost was construction of the MST and
all the launch complex cost. We're talking about just the support facilities around
it, and quite frankly, that is a SWAG. That is an absolute SWAG, but you're right.
MR. SULLIVAN: Again, you've got to be careful, if you SWAG low, then you're
going to go over the wrong number.
MR. CHRISTIE: Well, we've increased John's number about 40 percent. Go
ahead.
MR. HENNESSEY: Mike Hennessey, Intermagnetics.
SMES was not included in the price?
Did you say that the
MR. CHRISTIE: Right. We had a tough time costing that. We were hoping
maybe that Jim Lowe or someone else could help us on the cost side of the
SMES. We've got some costs in here for foundations and site preparation, but
SMES itself, we believe is a big number, and no one in the room felt comfortable
throwing out a number.
MR. WOODRING: Mary Woodring, General Atomics. You might want to take a
look at the alternative, and other than just SMES, part of the problem on this
thing, I think, is going to be power of distribution if you have one single SMES
unit you're doing. The real problem getting very far away from that, you might
want to look at a distributed array of motor generated or something like that,
would keep you clean and they're reliable and if used, least expensive.
MR. CHRISTIE: Thank you.
DR. BEER: I have a question, Neil Beer, on tunneling cost. Is that high, $400
million, because this is a 37-meter tunnel? This is only three miles long and
Swiss metro is --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's a ten-meter tunnel.
MR. CHRISTIE: Yes, we used costs from a couple of different companies on our
task force. They ran some numbers. They ran a lot of recent projects on a dollar
per mile basis based on cubic meters removed, and then we also backed it up.
We also did a sanity check for people that live in Colorado. The last 15 years
they have been talking about building a tunnel under Berthoud Pass to get to
Winter Park, and if you track that over the years, the last number that they have
been talking about is $350 to $400 million, about twice that long, that they, again,
the experts in the group felt that because we were boring at an inclination and
some other challenges, that they don't have at Berthoud Pass, and that's also a
four year old number, $350 million on Berthoud Pass.
DR. BEER: Is Dennis Lachel here yet?
MR. CHRISTIE: No, unfortunately Dennis wasn't in our group. He was the only
one missing.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Doug Kirkpatrick. The Operations Group thought that
having one rail, one failure would shut down the whole operation could be a little
extreme. We thought maybe we could make two tunnels or a double-wide
tunnel. Is there any economy in scale that can be gained from doing a double-
wide tunnel, having two rails through, that a failure in one tunnel doesn't shut
down the whole system?
MR. CHRISTIE: Where's Maynard?
DR. SLAUGHTER: I don't know the answer to that.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: It seems to me to throw a 200,000 pound cradle, though,
off of the track, the other one that --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You wouldn't want it too close, which means two full
tunnels.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Right.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Which sounds like twice the revenue.
MR. CHRISTIE: Good input. I know when you get into dollars, people are
always interested.
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Okay. We looked at the programmatics side of this, and as far as is it feasible to
build in the time we talked about and what some of the steps are, and so what
we did is we broke it into, if you will, Phase 1, which is feasibility, and some of
these items here and then full-scale deployment. We're going to assume a
notice to proceed June 1, Neil, so take all the time you've got so long as it's only
three weeks or less, a couple of weeks. We broke this into individual and
cumulative, so these are estimates in years. This is a cumulative in time, and we
have taken it, like I said, from the feasibility down to full scale deployment. It's
obvious, you can see the tall pole in the tent according to the group, with some
environmental and site investigation, two and a half years, and maybe that's a
function of, again, where we zero in on, but it was recognized as one of the tall
poles in the tent.
MS. BURKE: What do you consider environmental? That's not a full DIS.
MR. CHRISTIE: Record of decision, so that we can dig dirt.
MS. BURKE: But you don't have the whole five year DIS. Could you waive the
whole five year DIS?
MR. CHRISTIE: I think it would be a function of where we go. That's what we
wrestled with. I mean, just depending on where you build this, that time line
could shrink tremendously or it could increase tremendously. But I had done a
year and I got crucified, so we settled on two and a half years. The design, we
looked at the design-build approach with some parallel going on between design
and construction at the same time. For management reserve sake, we stuck it in
contingency. With all of that you've got the five and a half years from notice to
proceed to initial launch capability of a full-scale system.
MR. CASSETTI You're going to have that same time line, whether you've got a
cut or a full tunnel it would seem.
MR. CHRISTIE: We thought it would be pretty close, Marlowe. With the
conceptual nature of this whole thing, we just used the same time line, unless
someone has done some homework since then. The question was, if we go to
the cut-and-cover versus the boring, are we going to really save that much time?
I think when we talked about this, Maynard, the parallel effort of that going-on
while we're building all these peripheral facilities...?
DR. SLAUGHTER: Probably save a little bit of time, but not much.
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MR. CHRISTIE: Right. Final comments, we believe there are some open
issues, more than what's probably the ones on this chart. Probably just food for
thought. Power requirements side people in our group felt very uncomfortable,
maybe not having the background in that area, to fully address it, but hoping that
someone else would address the power requirements, making sure that the
SMES was addressed technically, make sure, do we need to tie into a power grid
somewhere? With the kind of numbers we were looking at, we just thought it
was probably infeasible to do that. Many people brought up the market. Again
in our assumptions, we just assumed the market was there. Dual use, if it's a
dual use, it could drive the cost up even more. We were assuming that we were
going to go to more of a commercial approach. If that's not the case, then we
need better definition of facilities, and obviously, continue evaluation of the cost.
"What do we do next?" Neil, you asked. We believe you need to do a feasibility
study. You need to do a market analysis now, get your arms around this thing,
see what we've got.
NOT ROCKET SCIENCE, BUT MATCH SYSTEM COST TO
MARKET
***
COURAGE TO CHANGE !!!
And this is a comment just from a couple of us, and it's not rocket science, but
we must match the system and cost to the market. My last comment is, we've
got to have courage to change. We have got to have courage to change as an
industry and as a country, and that's just kind of an editorial comment. So with
that, I open it up for questions.
DR. FOSHA: Charles Fosha. Are there any facilities that may have some
infrastructure, like a Leadville mine? I'm thinking about that, it already has the
power and the facilities, was that discussed at all, like Leadville?
MR. CHRISTIE: Not a lot, really. That's a good thought. Maybe some of the
infrastructure concerns that Michael has could be addressed depending on
where it's sited. If we put it down south, central Colorado, there's abandoned ski
areas, lots of places for people to live, lots of condos down there right now. So
there are some costs we can avoid, and Colorado being a mining and agriculture
state, we do have some built-in infrastructure here. That's a good thought. We
assumed in the long run this thing was going to be environmentally approved. I
got a little bit of resistance from it, but I just made a comment that I spent the last
couple of days driving around the western states and we're putting a hole
through the mountain here. I don't know the last time you've been in Montana,
Wyoming and Utah, some of the big mines, but there are some big holes there,
and, yeah, they were permitted a long time ago and all that, but there are some
big cuts, some big mines, so we're going to assume it can be done.
DR. BEER: What are you going to do about the two-year problem? You have
showing 2001.
MR. CHRISTIE: We're going to get creative and market like hell, Neil.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Slow Teledesic then.
CAPT. CLAPP: Actually, the latest I hear from Teledesic is that they are most
likely to launch in the year 2000.
LT. COL. JOSLIN: Randy Joslin. Ralph, Case I you made about a billion in
investment largely in infrastructure, some of that was real estate. The expertise
in the group, did you discuss how much it would cost to maintain that
infrastructure on an annual basis?
MR. CHRISTIE: Not a lot other than we're real sensitive to the tunnel site, that
the design and the approach could really impact cost downstream. The wall
structure and the dewatering systems and everything, so we did not, if you will,
estimate a percent of capital cost would be recurring cost. We didn't get into
that. We didn't get into staffing, you know, how much staffing would it take to
support that. We just kind of ran out of time. That's obviously an issue. John
brought it up. We need to look at the whole life cycle cost of this thing to truly do
an economic feasibility, because the title is somewhat of a misnomer, because
what I provided you is just capital cost.
MR. TURMAN: Bob Turman. What case study were you using here? How
much energy do you store in the SMES, which one were you working with?
MR. CHRISTIE: Well, it was the case study for the Mach II, whichever one that
was. There's about four different scenarios that were in John's papers. Does
somebody have the numbers on the energy stored? I can't remember. It was in
gigawatts.
MR. TURMAN: Gigajoules is what it has here. I was wondering if we can get a
rough estimate on what the SMES cost would be.
MR. CHRISTIE: Right. We felt very uncomfortable with that. Anybody willing to
throw a number out? Yes?
MR. HENNESSEY: A very rough number based upon just current magnets puts
it up in the billion dollar range.
MR. CHRISTIE: Okay. So that's where we've got to get creative. One more
question.
DR. OBERLY: The SMES isn't the only way to store energy. That may not be a
cost effective way to store energy. If we did it with rotating machinery, potentially
you could do it cheaper if all of the requirements were right and still with inertial
energy stores.
MR. CHRISTIE: Okay. Thank you.


SESSION 4: OPERATIONS
Chair: Chris Chisholm, ANSER Corporation
DR. BLOW: Chris Chisholm is going to talk about some of the operations
considerations that they debated. Chris?
MR. CHISHOLM: The Operations panel, we took the approach that what we
would try to accomplish was identify some of the operational issues that would
affect launch and system design.
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What happened was something different. We got to one issue, namely, because
it took us over two hours on just that issue, and we had 15 minutes where we
kind of put together something at the end of what might be other issues. But the
issue we took was the overflight considerations, and that is a potential show-
stopper, so what we looked at is launch safety for inland launches, and the bad
news about this is it's tough. The good news is, we still have some work-around
room. That it's not a show-stopper yet, but we looked at two approaches. One
was from the aspect of the range layout. Could we lay out a range in such a way
that we could operate safely, and then the second approach was to look at it
from the aspect of expected casualty estimates and was there some way we
could work with the variables that you arrive at there. What we have as a basis
for experience is currently what is used on the existing ranges, like launches out
of the Cape, for example, is you need to achieve an expected casualty value of
something on the order of three times ten to the minus fifth, and DOT has a
figure tucked away that's ten to the minus sixth.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Under investigation, I might add.
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes. So let me talk first to our -- look at the range layout
problem, and what I'm stealing here are some very good slides that were
provided to me by Jeff Samella, who is a member of our group.
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What you have here is going from zero to 180 degrees launching out of
Colorado. These are impact point traces, and you'll notice that they end out
here. Given the launch, that's the point at which if the vehicle achieves orbit,
there's no more chance of an impact down here. Now, the catch to it is these
impact point traces do not bear a direct relationship to the ground track of the
vehicle. Let me show you.
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See, here, what the impact point traces look like. This is where the vehicles
launching out of Colorado would achieve orbit, so you see, they achieve orbit
while they're still over CONUS. The problem is, you can get a launch failure,
catastrophic launch failure back somewhere on one of these traces back along in
this area, but the debris impacts out here, so obviously it's a function of the
vector that it's on, and the velocity of that vector.
Taking a little closer look, these are the launches from zero to 90 degrees.
These dots on here represent cities with populations of 500,000 or greater.
What you don't get, of course, is the impact of population density, which if you
come down the east coast here, this is like a big red wall.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Flesh-colored wall.
MR. CHISHOLM: Right, flesh-colored wall. At any rate, as you can see, we
have a great deal of problem with any launch that's in the easterly direction from
there.
The thing, though, that still bears investigation is launches on a northerly
azimuth, a la this case, or southerly azimuths. There may be some windows of
opportunity in there. Of course, we have to look at those azimuths. For
example, on the northerly azimuth, as long as we stay with something around
zero degrees, we're out over eastern Russia, that's pretty much okay, but it
doesn't take us very long, we start getting down into Europe and another
problem area.
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On the southerly azimuths, as we extend those, again, as we start coming up
from the 180 degrees, then we start hitting some of the populated areas in South
America, but it does look at least on surface analysis, that there may be
something we can work, if we study it closer and refine it.
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In terms of supporting polar launches, which makes Teledesic doable, but for
other launches where we've got to go east, that remains a problem• So what we
need to look at there is can we do something with the expected casualty figures
to achieve the values that we need? And this is just a sample of a range of
safety analysis, and can show you some of the variables that go into determining
the expected casualty function. What you're looking at mostly is dwell time or
duration, that is, it is over a particular point in space, the probabilities that you
work out of impact, and this plays with vehicle design. And let's see, okay, we've
got dwell time and dwell distance and these work together. Okay, what that
leads us to is vehicle design, and attacking the problem treating the expected
casualty value.
MR. CASSETTI: Marlowe Cassetti. The range safety implications for countries
like Africa and Europe are all based by launches out of the Cape. When you're
doing northeast azimuths, you overfly Europe, you overfly Africa, that's
independent of most launch locations. The specific problem you have
addressing the inland launch is the near end problem really in CONUS that you
have. The other ones you can almost say, okay if we're able to wave off those
casualty expectations for launches out of the Cape, and I don't think Vandenberg
has that problem.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They do sometimes by the tip of South America,
some of the Atlas launches they did.
MR. CASSETTI: Yes. Still, what rm saying is, that maybe we really need to look
at just the CONUS problem, because that's where the most emotional part of it is
going to be.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Doug Kirkpatrick. The word we had was if we launch
three a week, we may increase the probability of conventional damage.
MR. CASSETTI: You're right. I forgot about the higher launch frequency. But in
a way, if Teledesic really launches a thousand birds, it's going to have that
problem regardless of where it launches. If it's Baikonur or Carou or Cape
Kennedy, well, just sort of--
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Has good insurance.
DR. CARTER: What's the casualty expectancy for line operation?
MR. CHISHOLM: Beg pardon, can you repeat, please?
DR. CARTER: What's the casualty expectation for the average airport?
MR. CHISHOLM: That's one of the questions we need to find out. What, if we
pursue the expected casualty value, we came up with a number of points that
need to be taken into account and a number of issues that have to be
addressed. And one of those is the need to find out what the criteria is that's
being used for airports today.
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The other thing, you know, is start at the top of the list here. One of the things
we look at when we start considering the vehicle, as perhaps the critical variable
in achieving the type of safety we want, we start going for nines in reliability. We
start driving the cost out of sight. It reaches a point where the curve goes
asymptotic and we're up at the peak, so that's going to have to be an issue that
has to be addressed. How many nines do we want to go to? We can't say at
this point in time, but we need to find out.
MR. HAYNER: You very quickly get to the point where the commercial airline
industry can't work.
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes.
MR. HAYNER: We have to get the commercial airline industry mentality. If you
keep talking rocket ship mentality and replay the people's hand, you're driven to
the boundary and you're out of business.
MR. CHISHOLM: Absolutely.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: If we go to the premise that the reusable vehicle has to be
manned, then we might have a problem, but if it be unmanned, why cannot we
just torch these like we do with all of the rest of the systems?
MR. CHISHOLM: Actually that makes your problem worse. That's the worst
thing you can do is have a destructive flight termination. Because now when we
put vectors cross range, back range, we scatter, and the problem becomes much
worse. In fact, that's one of the things that we wanted to look at in terms of flight
termination modes is --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I suppose a small nuke is out of the question?
MR. CHISHOLM: Right. One of the things that starts driving us into, away from
ballistic type vehicles and towards aerodynamic type vehicles where basically
when we get to flight termination, we can basically shut the switches off, shut it
down, and glide it to an impact zone or a safe area, or maybe, you know, again,
once we vent the fuel on board, if we can dump the fuel, we dump a lot of the
mass, maybe with at least the small launcher, we may have something that's
parachute recoverable a la Apollo, and then that reduces us to only having to
worry about the catastrophic failure, i.e., the thing blows up on us, and that's
something if we can get it down to that single type of failure mode that we're
concerned about, now we can start working to get a lot of the nines for that
particular failure.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If your vehicle can glide then both of your northern
and southern scenarios have a nice large body of water, Hudson Bay to the
north and the Gulf of Mexico to the south.
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Those are actually a lot closer than they seem.
MR. CHISHOLM: And the other thing, too, that we can look at, if we can
maneuver it, maybe we can start playing also with some of the eastern launch
scenarios. If we identify and understand fully all of the possible failure modes
and what our procedures are for each of those modes, and if we can establish
procedures that will get us into basically a safe out. So that's why I had as a
second point, whatever vehicle we use, we've got to get in and understand,
identify and understand what the failure modes are. We have to spend a lot of
time on that. We talked earlier in the group about prototype, and coming back to
establishing the overflight safety rules. We felt that the vehicle needs to be
involved in prototype testing. Now, whether we do that with the prototype track
or we take some other approach to doing prototype testing, it needs to be taken
into account, and if we're going to build a prototype track, can we build a vehicle
prototype to work with it? I'm not saying that we need to do that. I'm just saying
we need to take that into account as a possible consideration of bringing the two
programs together early on, and if we do that then that gets into where 'do we
do' the prototypes, you know, so where do we site the prototype facility and we
would need to take into account the availability of test ranges, White Sands,
Edwards, China Lake, take advantage of those, and also, do the prototyping for
the vehicle as well as the launcher. And finally, and this has already been
alluded to here, perhaps the biggest thing we need to do is public relations. We
need to convince and make people aware that these things are safe, and they're
safer than airplanes, and they've got airplanes flying over their head all the time.
And that's another thing that tends to drive us towards an aerodynamic vehicle,
because people can associate with that easier -- the airplane model -- than
they can something that's ballistic, which they tend to associate with rockets, and
as everybody has known for 30 some years, American rockets blow up. We'll
never get away from that perception, I don't think.
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Now, given that we spent over two hours on that, these are some of the other
issues that we came up with that we also feel need to be addressed. We need
to take a look, given the fact we're setting this on like a 14,000 foot peak, some
of the environmental impacts on operations; namely, you can get to where in
Colorado you got the jet stream dipping down, you can get some pretty high
winds coming out of there, and that may be a total crosswind, particularly if
you've got a northern launch tube. How is that going to impact our operations?
We're working at altitude. Do we need people up at the top working at 14,000
feet, oxygen gets a little thin, your ability to work gets a little thin. We're dealing
with quite a temperature change from bottom to top. Does that have any impact
on our equipment? We've got snow, ice to deal with, and lightning. You need to
take all these factors into consideration when we look at our operation. We also
need to look in a related environmental impact at where do we go supersonic?
What happens with the shock wave? Is it going to impact things on the ground,
and is that going to be a problem for us?
It's already been discussed earlier, the problem of a single launch tube or track
equates to a single point of failure, what can we do? Do we need to go above
ground and use cheaper construction materials in order to have two tracks to
stay in operation, or is there some way that we can tunnel, expand it to get two
tracks and whatever. It appears like the cost of tunneling and then doing dual
tunnels starts to get prohibitive, so I think we need to look for other alternatives
there.
We need to look at what are the maintenance requirements, servicing the
system, because we start launching on a frequent basis, and particularly
because considering igniting the engines in the tunnel, what kind of impact does
that have in terms of servicing and refurbishment? What are our rates? How
much time do we have to allot? What about repeated use? Do we have to worry
about alignment problems with the track? And we could go on from there.
We need to address the subject of getting, since this is a commercial operation,
DOT licensing or certification. What requirements we're going to have to meet to
achieve that.
MR. CASSETTI: Again, this vehicle is almost like an airplane.
certification and licensing?
Is there
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes. Well, I don't know about FAA certification and licensing,
that may be a point. One thing we have to do with the FAA is establish restricted
air space. And that didn't go on the list, but, yes, we acknowledge that that's
going to be a criteria, and always when you start negotiating for restricted air
space, it's never easy.
MORE ISSUES
PERSONNEL
, TRAINING/QUALIFICATION/CERTIFICATION
• N U M BERS/TYPES/SELECTION
REENTRY & LANDING SITES
• LOCATIONS
• INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS?
Personnel, we need to identify how many people we need, what kinds, how do
we select them, what training do we use for them, how do we qualify them or
certify them? Those are going to be significant issues for our OPS folks, and
finally, we need to look at the issue of reentry and landing sites. We've looked --
mostly we focused on launch, but we need to also start spending some more
time on the other half of the operation, which is recovering the vehicle after it has
deployed its payload, and that's going to be a cost we're going to have to deal
with is having the landing site. Do we use something that's existing and freight it
back, like land it at Edwards and then we get it back to Colorado, or do we look
to construct a site in Colorado? And if we do, what are the problems of weather?
I mean, when it's -- when we've got instrument conditions, basically, the shuttle
experiences, you land -- you require VFR weather to land. Can we do
instrument landing conditions and if we are going to land instrument conditions,
that means we have to have it powered in the final phase of flight in order to be
able to execute a go-around, or one person mentioned that there's an approach
with GPS differentiation, so we may have accuracy enough to dead stick it in
even in the weather.
So these are all things that we covered. We didn't have nearly enough time. All
we could do is raise more questions than we went in there with, but we think the
number one priority in terms of feasibility study has to be overflight, and we've
got to get to that first. And I would submit, too, that perhaps we are the wrong
people to be dealing with the cost. I don't know, but everyone I've been meeting
in the room, I get this very strong feeling that we're all technically oriented, and I
think what we need is to have a meeting where we have some of the folks from
the financial sides of our houses in here to help us deal with the cost issues,
because otherwise we're getting extreme spread here and rapidly the cost is
losing its meaning. That's the OPS panel. Questions?
MR. HAYNER: Mike Hayner from Bechtel. Is the weather a show-stopper?
MR. CHISHOLM: I don't believe the weather can be a show-stopper. It may,
you know, there may be launch days we can't launch, but there are also going to
be, obviously, a fair number of windows to launch in.
MR. CASSETTI: We've looked a lot at the SSTO, the inland launch situation,
and part of it is if you have a trajectory where basically for a vertical takeoff
vehicle, you're in a lofted trajectory, you basically get out of FAA air space before
you leave the confines of White Sands Missile Range, so in a way, you're in
restricted space over the range, if you will. Now, that's not to say you haven't
mitigated the instantaneous impact for other parts of CONUS, but at least you
can comply if you think of this thing as potentially an airplane, a rocket,
something that does fly back, you are dealing with FAA/DOT kinds of
considerations. The other thing, too, that's an aspect that may have been
overlooked is that when you deal at the Cape or Vandenberg with range safety,
you're dealing with the big gorilla on the base.
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes.
MR. CASSETTI: They are king of the heap. I mean, a four star general can't
turn them around. You're going to have it different if you're in a state-owned, you
know, who's the range safety officer, you know, or who has that authority? It's
an interesting situation, but you may be able to fly a heck of a lot more than
somebody who's flying out of one of these other ranges. I think Randy Joslin
went to Russia and he got some eye-opening experiences on what their range
safety is. They don't have destruct systems on their vehicles in Russia, and they
claim -- isn't that what they told you? Also very limited.
LT. COL. JOSLIN: We asked the Russians if they had a command destruct
system and we were thinking in our American mentality that that meant they put
explosives on the vehicle and destroyed them, and the answer kept coming back
from the translator, "Oh, yes, we have that system," and then we finally peeled
the onion back. What it was is they have a system on many of their vehicles, the
vehicle senses that it's departed from its trajectory at which point it sends signals
to the engines to shut down, then it's ballistic from that point, that's their self-
destruct.
MR. CASSETTI: They also claimed they never killed anybody.
LT. COL. JOSLIN: And they went, "In 35 years," and they went just like that
(knock, knock, knock), "we never had a problem."
MR. CHRISTIE: Ralph Christie with Merrick. You started to talk a little bit about
the range of vehicles and how it might enforce the impact limit lines. Was there
much talk about the Mark I through the Mark IV or whatever--
MR. CHISHOLM: No.
MR. CHRISTIE: -- different vehicle architecture, which ones are more sensitive
to this than others?
MR. CHISHOLM: No, we did not get into that. We stayed generally with the
lower end, small, medium class, aerodynamic mainly, because as we played with
this, as I say, very early on, maybe that's the big thing that we got out of our
group is aerodynamic vehicles became very attractive when you start trying to
wrestle with this issue. Ballistic becomes a lot tougher.
Russian Launch Vehicle Land Overflight
Although CISIRusslan launch sites ere located Inland, only limited launch azimuths are permitted with
the liP traces occurring over sparsely populated areas.
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COL. KIRKPATRICK: Doug Kirkpatrick again. I might add, I was in your group
and Jeff just repeated, I'm not sure everybody heard him, but in Russia, because
they are used to launching inland, not along the coast, we all think that, gee, they
must do it very safe or whatever, but Jeff pointed out to us, it was an eye-opener
to me, that Plesetsk has only four azimuths that it can launch imperially and
Baikonur has three azimuths that it can launch in, so it is also very range safety
oriented and restrictive and very limited in what it can launch, and that drives
them to interesting orbits on some of their satellites that we don't -- we wonder
how come you did that, and the reason is, range safety. They don't have a
choice.
DR. BLOW: One more question.
MR. CHRISTIE: The question of weather came up. As far as I'm concerned,
they have been launching vehicles out of Russia for years in the snow and bad
weather and anybody that has been at Poker Flats, it's not grand, it's all
suborbital, and ready to go like a commercial launch facility up in Churchill, so I
don't see that as an issue. Does someone see that as a show-stopper, the
weather? I mean, obviously, the launch rates are much higher.
MR. CASSETTI: We're just saying it has to be built-in.
MR. CHRISTIE: That's what I'm saying, you don't see it as a fatal flaw?
MR. CASSEI-I-I: No.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We don't have hurricanes like the Cape does.
MR. CASSETTI: Moving here from the Texas Gulf Stream, they've had higher
winds here than they do in the hurricane alley on a regular basis, and they don't
call them hurricanes or cyclones, they just say, "100 mile an hour winds. We lost
a few roofs and it will be sunny for the rest of the day."

SESSION 5: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Chair: Jim Lowe, Raytheon Engineers and Constructors
DR. BLOW: Our final session is going to be led by Jim Lowe, Raytheon
Engineers. He's going to wrap up all these loose ends and talk about the
implementation plan.
MR. LOWE: I'm Jim Lowe from Raytheon. I work out of Albuquerque. That's
one of the more pleasant places on the globe. And heading up the
implementation plan, the agenda was to talk about the MRC organization,
legislation and policy, legal liabilities, private and government financing, dual use
of spin-offs, land acquisition and environmental issues. We didn't have any time
left over.
I talked to my boss and told him I was coming to this meeting and he said, "What
are you going to do?" He asked, "What's the drill?" I said, "Well, I'm going to be
a session chairman and sort of a facilitator," and he said, "Why you particularly?"
And I said, "Well, I've been working on the SMES program for seven years, so I
worked on MagLev, so these are sort of enabling technologies." He said, "Well,
you know, you're a marine engineer, advanced degree, and there are no
shipyards left. You have an advanced degree in nuclear engineering and there
hasn't been a plant built for 30 years, so you're supposed to be the facilitator?" I
said, "Yes. In ten minutes I'm supposed to tell them essentially everything I
know as a stalking horse, and then let them ask questions." I asked if he had
any suggestions?" He said, "Well, in those ten minutes, I suggest you speak
very slowly!"
Fortunately, I had a very able group supporting me. So I'm going to talk about
the implementation plan, just give you a few highlights. This is sort of interesting,
a viewgraph that I picked up, which I recognize everybody is not going to be able
to read this, but this was from a one-time administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration talking about MagLev.
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And the quotation was, 'M#hat a great opportunity you have provided. Not only
for me, but for everybody. You have developed the largest coalition in the world
to promote high speed rail• You deserve all the credit for that•" And that was
almost 14 years ago.
A funny thing happened on our way to the forum. If you look at the headlines I
mentioned to the group, you could make up a montage which I trimmed out of
the papers, and I could have made-up five of theseT.
New FUnds Fuel
Magnet Power
.bbrTrains _,
Why the U.S.
Needs a
MaglevSys
Power for Trains
"Clinton to Promote High Technology With Gore In Charge."
"DOT Seeks MagLev Funds But OMB Opposes Effort," et cetera, ad infinitum.
Q: Which Path Should I Take?
A" It Depends Upon Where You Want to Go!
Lewis Carroll
So one of the real questions I suggested to the group, the issue sort of comes
down to this from Lewis Carroll, I quote, Question: "Which path should I take?
The answer: "It depends upon where you want to got" So with that in mind, the
question is where do we want to go? We're talking about organizational aspects.
This is another very interesting report, which I consider to be completely
relevant, and I recognize that that can't probably be read either, but it's out of the
General Accounting Office statement back in '93, and it talks about the MagLev
and high speed rail, and the relevancy here at least in a couple of sentences is
worthwhile recognizing.
"Private Financial Community Views HSGT
As A Risky Investment"
iiiiiiiiiiiii
"A general unwillingness to commit private and public financia._._1 resources to American
HSGT projects is the p_clpa___ have progressed beyond the
planning stage. On the'-b"_of the projects and analyses that we reviewed and on
_ion_ith members of the financial community who have experience with major
infrastructure investment projects, we believe that unless the federal government underwrites
a large part of the risk and assumes a larger role in HSGT financing, these projects are
unlikely to be built. HSGT development will require a long-term commitment of capital and
resources. Because there is little assurance that t_se syslems can earn a positiv.e..xet.um_n
investment capital, they are considered to be very risky investments by private investors.
Private investors will review HSGT projects to determine if the potential return on
investments are commensurate with the level of risk. Equity investors want a
or_pondingly high rate of return, as high as 30 percent according to some analyst, for
investing in a high-risk venture. Providers of debt-capital also want to be certain that the
system will generate revenues to pay the interest and repay principal,.."
Slate oJ' Ke_net/t M. Meot_
Ditto,or, Tr_uportatio_ I_s
Rcsou_ceJ Comma_q & Eeoc.omit OeveloFmem Olvilion
GAOIT-RC£D.93.23
"A general unwillingness to commit private and public financial resources to
American HSGT projects is the principal reason why no such projects have
progressed beyond the planning stage." Further on down, "Because there is
little assurance that these systems can earn a positive return on investment
capital, they are considered to be very risky investments by private investors."
And then in the second paragraph, "Private investors will review projects if the
potential return on investments are commensurate with the level of risk."
*GAO Strategic Comments
i_im_nnnnnnll
• "...Unless the federal government assumes a major
role.., thereby reducing the perceived investment
risks, private capital generally will not be
available."
• Several Strategies (Suggested by GAO)
- Financial & Administrative Assistance In Early Stages
- Loan Guarantees
- Extend Tax Exempt Status to Debt
- Revolving Loan Programs
- "Value-Capture" Strategies
*GAO/T-RCED-93-23
They went on to comment in a succeeding GAO report before the Congress, that
"Unless the federal government assumes a major role, thereby reducing the
apparent risk to the investment community, capital generally will not be
available," and they suggested various strategies. The problems they defined,
and I'm speeding along here, I wanted to make this like you talked about our
insurance, where the Prudential Insurance manager stands up and laughed, but
out of deference to the General, I couldn't do that.
PROBLEMS
• PERCEIVED TECHNOLOGY RISKS
• POLITICAL RISKS/DELAYS
• LACK OF DEFINITIVE REVENUE PROJECTS
• EQUITY RETURN
But the risk that we talked about were these and these are highly relevant to
what we're trying to accomplish as an organization to go on. What are the
perceived technology risks?
What are the political risks? And how many delays are you going to get out of
this program? And if you start looking at the various secretariat levels, every
single department of government is involved. Whether you're talking about
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Energy,
Department of Commerce, Interstate Commerce Commission, NASA, FRA, EPA
-- complicated problems -- so there's going to be risk and delays unless we
recognize them and try to structure and respond to them.
A lack of revenue, and we talked about that. Some of my predecessors here
talked very eloquently about defining that, and again, for the investors, is what
kind of equity return are you going to achieve? And Col. Joslin talked yesterday,
which I thought was very interesting, in defining the number of launches and the
perception that, is there a market and can we respond to it on a timely basis?
U.S. May Let Contractors Run Shuttle
This was out of the New York Times on Monday of this week, and had to do with
NASA and the space program, quoting the chairman of the committee, "Mr.
Gingrich said last March that he favored turning present and future launching
business over to industry. He endorsed a new NASA program to finance
research, a new generation of rockets to replace the shuttle. The new rocket
would be financed, built, owned and operated by private companies." And
further quoting, "The space agency wants to quit day-to-day operations and
focus purely on research." Obviously, the media does not make policy, but the
New York Times does pretty well sometimes in, at least, stating the facts and
anticipating them. So maybe all is not lost and maybe what we're talking about
here is certainly a very significant meeting in trying to focus our efforts and go
on.
And I must admit, consistent with some of the technical comments that have
been made and you will see this I think in their presentation, that when I start
looking at perceived risk to the investors and the community and the schedule,
we are operating on a pretty steep mountain and a very slippery slope. And
whether that schedule can be accomplished within the time frame -- I'm going to
leave to some of the people before me who have assessed the information, and
have the technical objectives in hand. I think they have expressed appropriate
concerns.
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But going on very quickly, let's talk about the organization. The bylaws, and
when I came to this meeting, I had not received in advance either the bylaws or
the business plan, and I sat up and read them in some depth and detail last night
and I certainly want to congratulate Neil on what has been accomplished. I was
pretty impressed when I got through. I went away with maybe a feeling of
cynicism to looking at all the perceived problems to the fact that this can be
achieved. My only question now is maybe not if it can be achieved, but when it
can be achieved. So that is the key point, I think.
This organization in the bylaws by the way, is defined as an organization in some
respects of the people that are going to be involved. It requires a president, an
executive vice-president, a financial director, a marketing director, government
affairs. Government affairs, we added to that organization. And we feel that in
ecognizing all the problems, that the organization should be centered around the
fact that we need a technical director, which has to certainly evaluate and come
down to a standard definition of the standard that we're trying to achieve. The
concepts and tradeoffs have to be achieved in a relatively short time. We have
to have some valid cost estimates that are going to support the investor
community. There has to be a technical liaison with both Department of Defense
and the commercial launch proponents as to how this sled can match with those
vehicles. And obviously, it's a problem that I think a lot of people have to look at
and respond to.
I think my colleague from Sandia made the comment about this being a difficult
problem. And Gary commented on the fact that going from 300 miles an hour to
600 miles an hour is not simply a 2X linear extrapolation of the problems inherent
in achieving that solution.
Finally, where I have asterisks, we put in a legal and risk management group,
and I think that group has to be an inherent part of the organization.
We have an environmental, which we felt should stand alone as a check and
balance. You don't want to subordinate it too far down the organization, and that
guy has to be able to go to the organization and report what he senses is
happening in the outside community.
And then we have an external affairs, which is both government and public
relations.
Marketing has to lean towards the customer, the public, the investor community
and relationships with government both at the federal and state level.
Now, I point out that the executive vice-president level I think should be probably
co-billeted with one of the other management fellows in the interest of economy
in the early stages of the organization.
What do we consider to be some of the critical issues facing the organization?
CRITICAL ISSUES
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
- ASSETS TRANSFER
-- LAND
-- GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBITS
-- TAX EXEMPTIONS
-- FCC CHANNEL ALLOCATION
TECHNICAL RISK REDUCTION
- PROTOTYPE DEFINITION/SIZING
- LOW COST DEMO
-- SCALABI LITY?
-- COST?
-- SCHEDULE?
- RISK ASSESSMENT
Along with the tasks laid on us, some of these have already been addressed,
and in that organization we felt very strongly that we had to look at government
assistance.
What assets literally can be transferable? Land. There is an analog for this, a
lot of the land was cosigned over for development of railroads in this country in
the last preceding century. Nothing should probably preclude the government
from making an assignment of land to us.
Again, the possibility of assigning and giving and granting geosynchronous orbits
is a freebie to this organization in being able to go out and market the products.
Tax exempt considerations and Federal Communication Commission frequency
channel allocation, includes having to bid on it, that this is going to be a nonprofit
group in its infancy. You're going to develop, every element of what we can get
out of the federal government ought to be exploited and attempted.
Technical risk reduction, and this sort of begs the question that Mr. Chisholm and
some of the other people have addressed and along with the question of Lewis
Carro!l, where do we want to go? What is a prototype concept definition?
What's the standard? What's the sizing of it going to be?
And more importantly, if we are going to have a low cost demo, what are the
scalability issues? What is the cost of it? What is the schedule feasibility? I
don't think this has really been addressed and some of my predecessors here
sort of said the same thing, that there is much concern about this. It is not a 2X
linear extrapolation from a 300 to a 600, and scalability is a big problem.
Everything I've addressed mostly in my life I've been bedeviled by scalability
issues with the exception of the SMES program, which turns out to be 100
percent scalable plus support.
Cost factors. My friend here, Ralph, from Merrick has identified that costs are a
humongous problem and a lot of areas remain to be identified, including the
power requirements. Chuck had spoke to the fact that -- Chuck Oberly, that
there are other ways of achieving power besides SMES. I would agree in the first
prototype, SMES certainly is going to be a very expensive item if it's going to be
used as a power source for this program. On the other hand, if you went back to
the ground base free electron laser program, the original concept there was that
utilities would use any SMES system as an asset in their systems with the
availability of peaking power being made available to the government for their
precise requirements and applications, so there might be a system that can be
co-shared with the local utility grid and they would be willing to take advantage of
that capability in some of the off-usage periods of time.
ENVIRONMENTAL
• OVERFLIGHT/FLIGHT TRAJECTORY
• LAUNCH GO/NO-GO
• AERODYNAMICALLY FLIGHT CAPABLE
Risk assessment, it's both a legal problem and a technical problem, and the
launch orbit overflight considerations are a significant part of that. You're going
to a direct, essentially, ballistic launch. You're over, say, White Sands for a very
temporary period of time. If you go to an aerodynamically flight capab!e system
with a lower trajectory, then you've got to look at the launch go, no-go criteria.
What are the orbits? How do you control it? And Mr. Chisholm addressed some
of those, and I thought he did it well.
We recommend that this, from our group, and while we were not the engineers
and the technical group assessing this, is we ought to look very much at the
aerodynamically or the Case II aerodynamically capable flight vehicle.
LEGISLATION/POLICY
• ENABLING LEGISLATION
- STATE
- FEDERAL
• REGULATORY AGENCY
• LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
- PUBLIC
- CUSTOMER
• SAFETY
Legislative policy. Has all of the enabling legislation been put in place? And I
think Neil talked very openly about the fact that we're talking about New Mexico,
Colorado, Utah, Texas, Oklahoma, potentially California. You start looking at all
the enabling legislation that is required, and conceivably some of it by the
Congress, if we're going to receive government assets and transfer for some
pretty sticky wickets that we have to go through.
What is going to be the key regulatory agency? No matter what we do, it is our
opinion that we're going to be faced with the safety issues, that you're going to
have government, be it the FAA, NASA, or somebody looking over our shoulder
to assure that practical and proper safety practices are being adhered to
throughout.
Liability limitations. The first opinion being issued in our group was that, gee, the
customer is going to take care of the liability issues for his own vehicle, and we
see that continuing. The public liability issue was discounted, but the fact is we
have a CONUS, central CONUS launch as opposed to a Canaveral or other
areas, and we're faced with the problem it is going to be viewed entirely different.
The orbit, the potential impact areas, the liability considerations, the question is,
should there be a liability limitation enacted by the Congress or guarantees
consistent with some of the ones that were enacted under atomic energy and
nuclear power plants, where there were a number of limits and the provision for
liability damage beyond that was being pursued and supported by the
government, so a big concern. We feel this is an area that has to be addressed
by the organization that we specified.
POLICY ISSUES (MARKETING)
• ANCHOR TENANTS
- GOVERNMENT (NASA/DOD)
- COMMERCIAL (INCENTIVE PROGRAMS)
-- USER FRIENDLY
-- COST INCENTIVES (LONG TERM)
• NOT INNOVATIVE (MATURE TECHNOLOGY)
Policy issues for marketing, and a lot of concern about this. If you're going to get
the investment community there, we've got to be able to address the possibility
of getting anchor tenants, either the government or NASA or DOT, and Col.
Joslin indicated the probability of that, which I think is probably true.
Commercial, it has to, and we're talking about the possibility that it has to be user
friendly, has to have cost incentives, and it can't be missiled. It has to be as
many people discussed before me, old hat, you know, like flying an airplane, and
people have got to have that kind of confidence and it has to be addressed.
One of the things that I suggested to Neil is something that I came back with
from a meeting in the Department of Energy last December on SMES, and I
talked to Dr. Ioddy, who is a USA manager for years, involving the topic of how
the meeting goes. "The best meeting I ever had with the Department of Energy,"
and he said, "Well, how so?" I says, "For the first time somebody in the
Department of Energy said they weren't going to do a damn thing for us," and
SMES was, as far as they were concerned, a dead program. There's not going
to be any money. He said, "Why is that good news?" I said, "1 don't have to
waste any more time with the Department of Energy."
What we have done since then and some of my Bechtel colleagues are doing
the same thing, we're looking at the possibility of joint venture structure and
financing where we would form an independent power management company,
equity partners would be a turn-key contract, and we would sell on a pay basis
the benefits of this system to various utilities.
Without identifying who they are, we are now talking to three different utilities that
have expressed keen interest and they would do this on a 15-year ba_;is.I think
that, I suggested to Neil, that, hey, $500 a pound is a goal, and that's very
ambitious, $2,000 a pound is less ambitious, but $2,000 a pound is a hell of a lot
better than anybody else is able to get payload into space, and maybe we have
to take in order to flush out the market. Col. Joslin I believe indicated that in
going around and talking to the commercial community, there is a reluctance to,
you know, say, "Hey, I've got an elephant in here," and say, "Let me see it." "No,
I can't tell you what it is. I can't show you this elephant." The fact is that there
may be people concealing their long-term strategic objectives in that community,
and if you go out and offer them an incentive where you say, "Hey, if we have
the system on line, you make no capital expenditures and we will launch for you
at $2,000 a pound or $2,500 a pound take or pay for all your payloads on a given
day, will you commit?" I suspect, since they have no capital investments,
nothing at risk, they may very well opt for that as an opportunity having other
acquisitions independent of that, which they will still be able to exercise. But at
least you can start directing that market. So I suggest this as a possibility of
making the program go.
Another thing, I guess we talked about and there was quite a bit of discussion
about this, is public relations in this program. Gaining customer credibility,
having demos that meet the investor community expectation, and as Sandia
indicated, it has to be earning on a measured basis. It shouldn't be so ambitious
that we can't take and have a measured set of objectives in achieving that.
o
PUBLIC RELATIONS
PARAMOUNT ISSUE
• SELLING TO THE PUBLIC
• SAFETY
• CONSISTENCY
• JOBS
• MEETING FOREIGN COMPETITION
Public relations is fundamental to this program ultimately. As with real estate,
location, location, location. If we don't have decent public relations on this
program bringing it along, it's a paramount issue, and we're not going to cut the
mustard. We've got to sell to the public. It's got to be safety. The program
standard has to be identified fairly early on, and as to what we're trying to
achieve, it has to be consistent. We can't go out and reverse course every three
months. We have got to be able to talk jobs. We have got to be able to talk
about a national goal, you know, in our culture here. We're certainly in a country
-- I talked to Neville and other people, Chuck Oberly -- we're blessed with a
culture right now that has no national goal. We've lost it. Somehow or other the
message has to be so important that we start establishing this program in
national ascendancy, technology ascendancy, it may be a national goal that we
want to achieve.
Certainly we're being threatened by the Japanese every day and this might be
an opportunity to save this program for our future. If you listen to the Newt
Gingrich third wave, his endorsement of that information technology is essential
to our productive future. It's essential to high technology. It's essential to jobs.
So public relations and their part in that organization, our group felt, was very,
very important.
SPIN-OFFS
• TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES FOR NATION
• MAGLEV GROUND TRANSPORTATION
• EMPLOYMENT/HIGH TECHNOLOGY
And spin-offs, which is the concluding viewgraph, in general, the program has to
stand alone. If you're going to get investor money into this, they have to
measure this program on what they see as a potential return on their investment
in this program. And there are potential spin-offs in other areas, which are
technology capabilities that possibly can be transferred into other areas.
MagLev ground transportation, other employment, high technology opportunities
which might be transferable.
It was generally felt that if we talk about MagLev that may be a downer rather
than an upper, because the program has gone through some very disappointing
economic analyses that say, "Hey, there's no return on it," and we're not going to
get there saying, "Hey, the big spin-off of this is going to be high speed MagLev
transportation from Boston to Washington D.C. at 300 miles an hour." We all
know that's not going to happen, at least in my lifetime, and it would be a long
time away. So the program has to stand on its own. Technology capabilities for
the nation and how we sell it in that respect we all felt was very important, and
obviously, I've touched on many of the same areas that my predecessors have
touched on, in the technologies areas, so I was supposed to start at 3:45. It's
taken me two minutes to give you all that information. All right. Thank you.
DR. BLOW: Questions?
MR. CHRISTIE: I have a couple. Ralph Christie of Merrick. You looked at the
MRC organization, you said you reviewed the document last night. Do you have
any feelings on whether that is the proper organization or best way to proceed in
driving this program? Are there other options or other organizations, pipes that
fit as well?
MR. LOWE: Well, let me throw that back up as a discussion point here. Yes, we
changed it, and the bylaws have spelled out an organization which is generally
consistent with how you would address a lot of these programs, but again, the
asterisks I pointed out on here are the technical director, the environmental,
which I think has -- we all felt -- when I say I, I speak for the group, so I do not
mean this to be egotistical. I had a very good group of people in there. External
affairs, public relations have to be outside. The other ones, finance, marketing,
government affairs, executive vice-president and president were all in the
bylaws. I frankly feel that the executive vice-president at this point is
inappropriate, that maybe one of these other jobs can co-share that job, wear a
double hat in the interest of economy and bringing the program along. One thing
I forgot to mention in external affairs, once you have a conceptual definition and
a tradeoff, I think you've got to go big time and very forward, very aggressively in
the Denver newspapers, in the Albuquerque Journal and elsewhere, do this, if
possible, with a first class presentation which the material was already there in
most cases, talk about capabilities, jobs, employment, or maintaining a
technological lead.
Then following that, the general feeling was that one of the things that should be
done very early is have a market survey or a public survey on some sort of a
nonidentifiable basis to find out what the public reaction is going to be. How
many environmentalists? How many 'not in my back yard' types are going to
stand up and scream, and what is the sense of the public reaction to that going
to be? And without that and without selling it -- you've got to sell. This is a
program that has to be sold. Without that, all the technology on God's green
earth is not going to make this program happen.
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Doug Kirkpatrick again. One of the things in Operations
we thought because of PR and we thought about PR quite a bit, was a lot of the
people would say, "You're not going to scar my nice-looking mountain, are you?"
And unless we own the mountain, maybe the company owned the mountain, still
will get a lot of environmentalists riled up, "You're not going to put a rail up my
mountain, or in this beautiful mountain and destroy the natural beauty."
MR. LOWE: Well, let me make a point maybe which correlates back to my
activities in superconductive magnetic energy storage. There were five sites in
the United States; Monahan, Texas; White Sands; Hanford, just north of
Madison, Wisconsin, and where was the other one? The interesting thing, and
you've got to live in Wisconsin to appreciate this. No matter whether you're
talking to the Alcoholics Anonymous or the gay community or whatnot, there are
15 different shadings of political opinion in every one of those groups. When you
went elsewhere, whether you're talking Monahan, White Sands, Hanford, people
thought jobs -- boy, when you talked about employment, when you talked about
technology, what this meant to the program and to the area, big support. Tough
problem in Wisconsin. I don't think we could have ever gotten the program
endorsed or built in Wisconsin despite the fact that its a public utility. So again,
public relations, you know, who owns the mountain, and who that mountain is
going to impact and whose back pocket and whose wallet is affected, I think
makes a big difference, and where it's built and how it's sold is critical.
By the way, Ralph Christie, I think, brought up something that should not be
overlooked. The environmental impact statements have to be filed on this, and
you've got like a six months filing period and after it's filed, there has to be a
public hearing, preliminary and then there has to be final, and, boy, even if you're
a wizard, that's a one-year process, and the environmental impact statements on
the areas, and you start looking at this program to be brought along by the
technical group fairly early on to start developing and working with the Army
Corps of Engineers who are likely, no doubt will be the ones that will assess the
environmental impact statement.
MR. TORGERSON: A key part to that is, we talked about in our group, is that
the description of proposed action alternatives would have to come out of that
technical group, you know, and back it up two and a half years and that really
forces some early decisions on what the system is going to look like, what the
facilities are going to look like. You really can't commit resources without filing a
decision, so a lot of decisions have really moved up the pike just because of the
environmental impact statements.
MR. LOWE: Absolutely. Whether you're going to be able to maintain the
investment, community interest during that period of time while you're still
hanging on the environmental limb, which God knows there's a lot of people
willing to saw it off, is going to be a tough question, kiddo.
MR. CASSETTI: It's my own personal belief that large government investments
have to go into this, because of the fact that it's major research, development,
technology, and only the federal government can afford it. Did you guys touch
on how you sell this to the government to convince them, since these are the
same kind of issues you looked at in other Mag rail systems and other energy
programs, et cetera, did you touch on that at all in your sessions?
MR. LOWE: We only had two and a half hours. No, I think the answer is, yes,
we briefly touched on it, and one of the thoughts that got generated is, you've got
to talk to people like Gingrich early-on through people like Domenici and your
senators here in the state, and excite his attention.
Gingrich, and I was privileged to go to the War College and have dinner two
evenings in a row with Newt Gingrich, and he's a remarkable, I think, almost
brilliant individual, and whether that's going to be adulterated by ambition here is
a good question. He's very consistent. He's got a long memory and he's very
much endorsing this sort of thing in other public statements, which I can probably
cite and invite to the General's attention, and I guess I think if you start getting
endorsements at that level of the Congress, along with people like Pete
Domenici, the program can be sold and you can get support.
A lot of it, along with one of the things we suggested, I think, has to come in is
asset transferal and how you achieve that and get grants and tax freebies is a
tough road as well, because one of the things, by the way, and I mentioned that
the society, the National French Railroad Association or whatever it is in their
terms, formed a similar organization that is being proposed here by the MagLifter
group, nonprofit, and they kept all hardware manufacturers and suppliers out of
direct control. And as a hardware manufacturer, you know, in Raytheon, I am
sympathetic to that, because, you know, there are other people that feel, "Hey,
I'm getting in here early in the trenches, I'm going to get some of the hardware
that the program develops." Yet there is still the residual effect that when you
start going public, people say, "Well, who's participating in this program?.... Well,
Raytheon is participating, and XYZ Manufacturing Corporation." Those people
are running a scam and they're just trying to get business for themselves. The
organization has to be set up with some degree of cleanness, so the governing
body at MRC and even the succeeding organization if you go to Phase III, has to
be impervious to scam accusations, that people are cutting up the pie internally
for themselves.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Just one observation in reply to Marlowe, and that is, when
they put this railroad to span the continent here, rll bet you that railroad didn't
take a nickel of government money to do that. I'll bet you the percentage of
gross domestic product, that this project was a fraction of what that railroad cost,
and yet they did it all with private capital.
MR. CASSETTI: Well, the only thing I can think of is about a year or so ago, I
was at a conference where somebody from the government was expounding
about how the next generation launch system was going to be funded entirely by
private capital. And so the question was asked from the audience. "Would
everybody in the audience who thinks private capital is going to fund this, raise
their hand," and there were quite a few hands raised. And then the guy who
asked the question said, "Now, put your hand down if you're with the U.S.
government," and every single hand went down. There wasn't one person from
private industry that said, "Yes, we are going to fund this."
DR. BEER: We need to interrupt just a second. Also in what you read in the
bylaws, there is a science advisory group, and there's a management advisory
group. What is missing is the strategic planning group -- the effort to devise
what the plan iwill be for public acceptance, government acceptance, and the
plan we would brief to CEOs. Neville Marzwell is going to speak to this, but first,
can we give John Mankins, who has got to get all the way to DIA, and so is going
to have to depart before we finish, a couple of minutes?
MR. MANKINS: Now, my presentation. I just wanted to say, the cookies have
been great. I've enjoyed very much the last day and a half of discussions in this
working meeting. I think that it is a huge triumph to end up with a group of
individuals from so many different organizations, and for everybody that's here, a
common thread, that the notion of electromagnetic launch assist is net undoable.
There are a lot of issues. There are questions of development pace and the
question of technical uncertainty, a lot of issues that have been raised in the
discussions, but believe me, when I started talking about this a couple of years
ago, it was not only unthinkable -- it was not only unproven, it was unthinkable.
So this represents to me, this meeting and the discussions, terrific progress, and
I look forward to the proceedings from the meeting and the contribution that
they're going to make from the standpoint of making electromagnetic launch
assist and related concepts a part of NASA's thinking.
I know there are a lot of other activities ongoing in the Air Force. I just walked
out with Capt. Clapp from Phillips Lab who's on Colonel Sponable's staff, and he
has a variety of additional ideas, but I think that this area of investigation is one
that has enormous promise.
And I wanted to offer -- I know this is Gen. Beer's meeting, but I wanted to offer
my own thanks to you for your participation and involvement. Thank you very
much.
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DR. BLOW: As our last segment, could we have all the session chairmen please
arrive here at the front table, and take any remaining questions that we might
have from the group. I think it's been a very compelling session. The issues
have been hard. The people have been smart and there's still a lot more to do. I
think this is going to be a really excellent project. Are there any questions to
start out with?
COL. KIRKPATRICK: Yes, sir. Doug Kirkpatrick. We've looked at a variety of
launch elevations, 20 degrees, 45 degrees. The Operations group had 75
degrees. Is there anything technically wrong with going straight up, MagLift
straight up? We accelerate a 1.3 million pound vehicle straight up.
DR. BLOW: Does anybody want to take that one?
MR. TURMAN: I guess that kind of falls into the technology area. Yes, I think
there are problems with trying to accelerate straight up. For one thing, one of
the concepts, one of the operational advantages of MagLifter that we've been
talking about is the horizontal integration of packages, and if you throw that
away, now you're looking like a launch pad once again with vertical integration. I
think there is a big advantage to going somewhere in the 30 to 40 degree angle
elevation.
DR. BLOW: Could I ask, sir, why do you ask that question?
COL. KIRKPATRICK: The reason I asked that, from an operational standpoint, it
would be nice to be able to take any azimuth. You know, start horizontal,
accelerate up the tunnel vertically, then you could go any azimuth. Turn the
vehicle to the azimuth that you want to take. It really makes it flexible.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: Maybe I can give the answer to his question.
DR. BLOW: Kindly identify yourself, please.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: Adam Siebenhaar. The reason it stays in orbit is horizontal,
is parallel to the surface. Any component you have from the main direction is a
total waste.
MR. TURMAN: Just to get out of the atmosphere, you want to go as straight up
as you can, going out of the atmosphere.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: Well, you gain a little bit on your velocities.
MR. TURMAN: Right.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: And come up somewhere else.
MR. SULLIVAN: Ron Sullivan, Lockheed Martin. There is a trade to be made
and this point is well taken. If you could get up to geo, if you had enough
acceleration and delta v to get the potential altitude to geo, you wouldn't have
much problem getting an orbital synchronization with a small delta v. The
problem is that potential energy is equivalent to kinetic energy which is hard to
come by, that's why this isn't working. Bottom line is, I think his question is well
put. I think the vertical integration versus 45 degrees or 35 degrees is not that
big of a deal if you were in a situation where you just come in on a horizontal
position and you install the satellite or whatever it is you were trying to put in
orbit, and I think technically the MagLift part is just one more extra detail that you
have to overcome, so that should not be a big deal. The problem is bringing it
up vertical. The whole advantage is to give you longer length or vertical velocity,
so Adam's right, but you do get the trade and you do get part of that energy back
as you start accelerating. Zero losses, X losses in a horizontal operation.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And you have more customers with a better
azimuth, flexibility.
DR. BLOW: Mike, did you have a question?
MR. HENNESSEY: Mike Hennessey, Intermagnetics. It's actually easier to do
vertical from the MagLift standpoint, because your lateral forces are small, and
you don't have the levitation problem.
DR. BLOW: Maybe separation would be easier.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's the power that's involved in here, too.
You've got more Gs for propulsion and velocity, rm assuming that just means
more electrical power to increase the magnetic. Is that too much? Is that over
the limit? Is really my question.
MR. TURMAN: Well, that's probably another 30 percent or so in power. Now,
what we're looking at scaling from right now is about a factor of five or something
like that, scaling in power from where the magnetic propulsion technologies feels
comfortable, so if your scaling has a factor of five or six or seven, it may not be
that much of a technology step.
MR. HOWELL: Joe Howell, NASA Marshall. We ran the pyramid studies on this
to launch with a pure rocket vehicle and that's one of the charts that John has
been showing and the optimum angle for launch that we came up with is around
60 to 70 degrees. It drops off a little bit if you go straight up, and not a whole lot,
though, and then it drops if you go -- veer hard on, it drops away. The optimum
angle, just getting the mass to orbit, is around 60 to 70.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: For payload fraction to orbit, right?
MR. HOWELL: Right.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: The amount of payload basis?
MR.
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HOWELL: Okay. The amount of payload to orbit just based on launching at
miles an hour at 10,000 foot output, just looking at the velocity and altitude
varying angles, and the angle came out at about 60 to 70 degrees.
MR. CASSE'F-FI: Do you know what the losses are taking the -- if you keep that
setup to go into a polar orbit, you've got the track going to the south, let's say,
and you want to now go to an equatorial orbit or launch to the east, do you know
what the payload losses are for that?
MR. HOWELL: Okay. We ran some numbers on that also, and launching due
east from like 33 degrees latitude, say, was putting up 39,000 pounds to orbit, if
we went over to about 20 from that, plane change to about 20 degrees, it was
about five, 6,000 pound loss in payload to make that plane change, and this was
a purely rocket powered plane change, no lift to body effect at all.
MR. CASSETTI: 5,000 off 20,000?
MR. HOWELL: About 5,000 off of 39,000.
MR. CASSETTI: Of the 39,000?
MR. HOWELL: Right. Five to 6,000 off of the 39. We did not look going all the
way to polar on there. That would be quite a number to go all the way to polar.
MR. CASSETTI: See, that's the problem we get into is you tend to -- there's a
tendency to be two classes of satellites. Those that like to be in equatorial orbits
and those that like to be in high inclination.
MR. HOWELL: Right.
MR. CASSETTI: And those are not mutually exclusive for this, but there's a big
cost here.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you have an aerodynamic vehicle, particularly if
you have a combined cycle or an air breather engine in there, there might be
quite a bit of maneuvering ability which would help with the question that you had
about being able to come to the full range. So a hybrid vehicle might be a good
thing to look at.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: rd like to add that 600 miles per hour, a relative
cost in delta v feet per second is small in terms of air propulsion, air frame.
We're talking about 5,000 to 39,999 is a small penalty. The real problem comes
in is like typically when you have to dog-leg around Cuba or something like that,
or polar orbit, you pay a penalty to do that, because your velocity time to do that
dog-leg is high. And so, again, there's trades. If you're vertically launched and
you come out at four or 5,000, 6,000 feet per second, then you have an
inclination or not inclination, but a pitch angle problem, that is the flight path
angle is more of a detriment than it is at 600 miles per hour, and you'd rather be
down around probably 45 to 30 degrees is where the optimum trajectory point
would be, but to make a plane change, 90 degrees is perfect, so that gets into
some issues in terms of the best way to implement this technology.
MR. BLOW: Any other points to made? Yes, Gary?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'd like to suggest maybe a possibility for an evolutionary
delivery might be able to bring in our schedules, and that would be considering
that electromagnetics might be our ultimate objective, that we might simplify the
track and simplify recovery from the crash inside the slot or the tunnel, by going
with a straight rail, and then taking the sled or shuttle part of this thing, and
putting like four big turbo fans on that thing, and then using it in the ground effect
mode to move that thing, and just use a straight jet. I mean, you carry enough
fuel on board to move this 100, 200,000 pound thing to try to get that exit velocity
and then let it light-off the other side and come down the rail to decelerate, and it
might speed up this whole process and we're not sitting here with commutators
and armatures and everything else strung up and down miles and miles to
alleviate us buying billions of dollars worth of storage and et cetera. You know, it
may bring the economics to us and make the possibilities.
DR. BLOW: I may be missing something. Are you talking about steel wheels on
steel rail, or shoes or something?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, I'm talking about ground effect on the rail itself by taking
-- you've seen the carrier, you know how that works. By taking directed thrusts
off of these things, pressurizing an air film underneath the carrier vehicle, and
then using forward -- using thrust, conventional thrust, after-burners, whatever,
on a couple of the engines to get the forward delta v.
DR. BLOW: What's providing the -- you said --
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Take a couple of the engines and just direct their exhaust
gases.
DR. BLOW: You're getting both lift and propulsion?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Right. And take a couple of after-burners to get forward, and
it might just speed up the time line to get an evolutionary delivery underway. It
would cut a lot of costs out pretty quickly.
DR. BLOW: Am I the only one who is not catching on to this?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is this a test vehicle you're talking about?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, it is just something we could use for a couple, three
years until we can afford -- we hit that break even, make a profit point and then
we can start a second bore and fill it full of electronics.
MR. TURMAN: I think I understand the question that you're raising there and it's
one of how to get to the objective. What we have been talking about here is
magnetic levitation, magnet propulsion. In the transportation industry, that was
looked at previously, that's called an air cushioned vehicle. You use an air
cushion levitate it. Now, that's going to have to be a million pounds of levitation,
so it's probably a big pressure and quite a bit of power required there, then,
rather than the magnetic propulsion, you hang enough 747 engines on that
carrier to get it up to the same velocity as the 747. Doing it in the same sort of
conceptual framework that we've been talking about here, keeping it on the
ground or in tunnel, so that we're doing the same thing except using more
conventional propulsion. I haven't run any numbers on that. We were talking
about it a few minutes ago. The 747 doesn't accelerate in the same sort of
distance that we're talking about here, so that's more than four 747 engines,
that's probably ten or 15, I don't know what the number is, but I think it's a
tradeoff that needs to be looked at, because that's an obvious question when we
come with the strategic planning questions that were raised. When you go to a
CEO, he's going to ask that question or somebody is going to ask that question
pretty fast. So once again, it's a question of doing a quick OPS decision to make
sure that the framework we're talking about is the most efficient one. I think that
probably what will come up is that you will need more thrust and more engines
than you can easily get out of a set of jet engines to do it on a short time frame.
A jet just doesn't accelerate at three Gs, but we may not have to accelerate at
three Gs either if we get a long enough runway, so I think we need to look at
that.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, especially, I take it, it takes cost out of some capital
items and puts them elsewhere, and I think also you eliminate, you reduce the
cost per mile of this thing, so maybe you can afford at a lower cost to build a
couple of more miles of it or so. Because the objective, as I see it, is not
necessarily even to build a magnetic technology. What I see as the objective is
low cost to orbit, and so I see things like this one to four percent gross liftoff
weight is our payload, that sort of thing. If this is going to be a problem, we've
got to work on those little numbers and get those in the larger numbers, two digit
numbers, that sort of thing, and so it's like I don't want to see us lose our
objective, which is to get to market quickly, turn a profit as soon as we can
without getting crazy about it, and then we could work out an evolution delivery
of even better technologies.
DR. BLOW: I know John Mankins isn't here, but he's talked about before about
having I would call maybe not innovative, but maybe alternative concepts to get
the job done that don't necessarily depend on the electromagnetic substances,
so maybe that's, at least, one to put in a notebook and kick it around. Anybody
else want to bring up another question altogether?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: My assumption here is that the tunnel costs are
proportional to volume, which is proportional to the square of the radius, and I
think your presentation was driven by the aerodynamic vehicle. Does this argue
for some study on variable configuration? Variable means, it's very narrow
through the tunnel and opens up to the air, or has that already been --
DR. BLOW: For air flow advancement you're talking about?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, to keep the tunnel diameter radius small, but
then once it leaves the tunnel, it needs to be aerodynamic.
MR. CHRISTIE: I think it needs to be looked at. I mean, the sensitivity is a
dollar per cubic meter of soil removed or rock removed, that was kind of the
number we used. So if you can reduce that, obviously then you'll reduce the
cost. On the other case, we didn't have a tunnel. We had a cover, and then you
may notice that the costs were cut in half, rough order of magnitude cut in half,
so, yes, I do think we need to look at that.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess that would be a technology issue.
MR. CHRISTIE: Yes. It's not so much an industry standard as with the
gentlemen we had in the room. He had one number of a tunnel that was bored
here recently. We used that and then we bounced it off of this recent cost
estimate that's been kicked around, the tunnel at Berthoud Pass, and the
numbers weren't that far off, so we just ran it through the mountain.
DR. BLOW: I'd like to ask a question myself, Ralph, does the shape of tunnel --
I've seen the schematics. It looks elliptical. Does that pose any kind of a
construction, raw capital construction problem?
MR. CHRISTIE: We don't think so. I think Maynard and others thought, actually,
the elliptical shape was better, was more efficient. Is that right, Maynard?
DR. SLAUGHTER: One boring will make almost a perfect ellipse.
DR. BLOW: In one pass?
DR. SLAUGHTER: Yes.
DR. BLOW: Gary, do you have a question?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, I was going to offer that maybe even if the vehicle is an
air breather, that on the ascent phase borrowing something from one of the other
speakers, that we want to get it out of gravity pull as quickly as possible, perhaps
we don't even care to deploy the airfoils on the ascent phase. They stay entirely
retracted until the descent face, and therefore, it would reduce the size of the
bore that you need. You know, that it's ballistic except it's an air breather.
DR. BLOW: Wrap around surfaces?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Not the aerodynamics system, only the pilot.
DR. BLOW: Any comment from the session chairmen on that?
MR. TURMAN: Certainly the swing wing aircraft design is something that you
use, like an F-111 and its full swept-back configuration, and it pops back out
when you're landing. I guess that technology is pretty well-developed. It's a
question of reliability, making sure that you got the wings when you need them,
though.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: If you have the wings, you might as well use them,
otherwise they're just dead weight and the movement even heavier, so I don't
see the logic in using anything like that.
MR. TURMAN: Well, what he is trying to do is trade off the initial tunneling cost
and you would gain in tunneling cost, but you would lose in weight, so that's the
trade off.
MR. RODRIGUEZ: If you get them out there on your ascent phase, you don't
need them. They're just drag.
MR. TURMAN: I thought we needed them on the ascent phase for safety?
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Sure, but for safety you would employ them, if you have to.
DR. SIEBENHAAR: I think everybody agrees that if we have altitude and
velocity that is going to be beneficial. We don't need to demonstrate that. What
we need to demonstrate is how do we get to the G, okay, and if you want to go
with a MagLift, that's what you have to demonstrate, otherwise you have missed
the point.
MR. McALLISTER: Has anybody commented on the diameter necessary for the
balloon?
DR. BLOW: The diameter necessary for what? I'm sorry.
MR. McALLISTER: The balloon for the rocket.
DR. BLOW: Post ignition?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't feel that engine really should go in full thrust
until you've gone past the axis.
DR. BLOW: Gentlemen, do you have a model of the ignition? I mean, is that a
flexible point right now?
MR. CHRISTIE: If l can comment, we made the assumption that there were
several hundred yards, if not more, behind the rocket or the acoustics and over-
pressure considerations. I mean, and when you normally launch a rocket, you've
got a plane bucket, you've got things that are channeling all this overpressure
and deluge of water and everything else, and we're setting this thing down in a
shell and it's got no place to go, so we just recognize that that's an issue. We've
got to leave some space behind the rocket and we're going to have to look at the
acoustic overpressure issues, so that cannot be overlooked.
MR. CASSETTI: Also, the acoustics on payloads.
MR. CHRISTIE: On payloads, exactly.
DR. BLOW: Yes, sir?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Why do you have to have a rocket on during this
acceleration other than make the idle conditions, make sure they're operating?
MR. CHISHOLM: Well, the main thing we want is to get ignition just prior to
release and verify that we've got ignition before we commit to a release from the
cradle. If we don't get ignition, you know, we want to ride the cradle on down
into abort mode without ever releasing. We don't need to go to full power I don't
think, unless we get to studying it and we find out there's a potential failure mode
in throttle. If there's a potential failure mode in throttle, then we have to
reexamine it, but I think all we want is to verify ignition.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Two points. You know, if you're a solid, it's
probably a very, very small percentage of the times it's not going to ignite.
Secondly, if it does ignite, whether it's a solid or a liquid, there's a finite possibility
it's going to explode after it goes into full power. The bottom line is, is that to
constrain in any significant manner at all the design of the tube or the housing
system or external seems to be premature at this point in time, and furthermore,
you certainly will not want to waste the rocket fuel that we've got, you know,
accelerant, that's essentially for -- we want that for the delta v beyond it. So an
idle condition if it's a liquid system, fine. Make sure everything is running so
we're ready to go, but other than that, I don't know you need it. And as far as
riding the rail on down, now you've got to take all this mass, which is, you know,
several times what the sled is, and accommodate that with design of the
recovery system.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's better than just throwing it out there across the
wild blue yonder.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Because you've got population out there.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's not going to go that far at 600 feet per second.
MR. CHISHOLM: Another thing, I admit it's an important consideration, but it's
very bad public relations when we send them off and you fail.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If it crashes.
MR. CHISHOLM: Yes, unfortunately it's business. You can be sure it would be
in the New York Times.
MR. MUELLER: Don Mueller, Colorado Tech. There is another reason I think
why you may not want to ignite the engine while it's on the guide rails. If you're
using MagLev, the clearances are not that large, and if the thrust axis is not
aligned perfectly with the rails, you're going to generate side forces that may
cause you to kiss the rails inadvertently, and, you know, you're going to have the
same problem if you have an aerodynamic lifting vehicle also ride those rails,
you're going to have the problem of containing the clearance on the MagLift
system with unpredictable side forces.
DR. BLOW: Well, when you say small, you're talking about the lateral
clearances?
MR. MUELLER: Well, I'm talking about the whole reason you're going to
MagLev is to avoid bumping the rails, otherwise you go steel on steel, right? So
what I'm saying, if you light an engine and its thrust access is not perfectly
aligned with the rails, you're going to generate side forces that you don't want
and may not be able to handle.
MR. CASSETTI: The other aspect that you have is if you have a liquid fueled
vehicle that's being accelerated down this track and it exits out the mountain,
what is the first thing that is going to happen to it? It's going to decelerate pretty
quickly because of drag. All the propellants are going to go rushing out away
from the engine, so you've got to have a pretty complex way of keeping fluid flow
to the engines and keep from adjusting vapor. That's a tough problem. So
you've got to somehow moderate the acceleration provided by the rocket part to
overcome the drag as soon as you hit the atmosphere or as soon as -- I should
say, not as soon as you hit the atmosphere, you're going to be in it most of the
time, but as soon as you stop accelerating with the magnetic carriage. With the
carriage, as soon as you get off of that carriage, you're going to be sliding
propellants from the front of the vehicle. Now, it's just the laws of physics, so
you've got to have an extra complication on there unless you've got a way of
positively accelerating off of that carriage with the rocket. More than the drag is
accelerant.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It sounds to me like you're making an argument for
solid propellant.
MR. CASSETTI: There's another argument with solids, though, they tend to be
dirty and people don't want them in their state or their tunnels.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Some of them don't want them in our space ships.
MR. CASSETTI: So it's not an easy solution. In fact, in the early days of ICBMs,
they destroyed a lot of ICBMs before they realized they had propellant slamming
to the front of the tanks when they shut the engines off. So, you know, for safety
and so forth.
DR. BLOW: Joe, is this kind of an open issue as far as Marshall is concerned?
MR. HOWELL: Yes, it is. But you certainly have to have a potent enough
accelerator to overcome the problemswhen you clear the cap.
DR. BLOW: Sounds to me like there's a modeling challenge built into modeling
this off-axis ignition possibility, is that something you do?
MR. HOWELL: Well, I don't make those disturbances, but the Holloman sled,
they've got a vapor lock on there and it stays the thing, too. It's my
understanding, they got these disturbances in their system that they design
upon, and surely, we can have the feedback off of them before we want to go
here, so I certainly think that's something that we can do.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Certainly running this thing from horizontal to some
angle as well, there's got to be hitting the rail as you go.
MR. HOWELL: Certainly.
DR. BLOW: Mike, did you have a comment?
MR. HENNESSEY: Yes. If the off axis is firing, it can be solved pretty easy at
the end of the track. You can provide propulsion so that you have both levitation
and propulsion from the top to hold it in a small tube for a few, I don't know, few
hundred feet, and fire it there right on center, the propulsion system.
DR. BLOW: And lateral, you have lateral control, too?
MR. HENNESSEY: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And I had a couple of points to make. One, asking
an issue about that, I think that an added interest is the duty-up cycle and
throttling and might be one thirty-second with 600 feet per second, 200 feet per
second, quarter of a second or so, and I don't know what the throttle rates are on
the turbine speed at full throttle on the rocket system. The second point is if
you're at relatively high coefficient, you're coming off 600, 800 miles per hour, in
600 miles per hour, 800 feet per second or so, I doubt the drag is such that it's
like slamming through a brick wall. It's going to slow you up, but I think you can
account for that in the way you handle the propellants and in the positive
displacement system and make sure --
MR. CASSETTI: You have to go to positive displays.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: For that start-up session, which is only a couple of
seconds or so, that you can maintain the fluid positive displacement condition. A
solid would solve that, you know, all the ICBMs and Stealths ignite and do the
things, same with all our tactile missiles.
DR. BLOW: What kind of penalty, if any, do you pay in propellant? I mean, are
you saying --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's a matter of its going out inertly or displacement
bladder or a separate small tank, or whatever, to assure that you have a positive
displacement uninterrupted to the feed system of the turbines to the engine. You
just have to account for that and I agree with Douglas' comment about that.
LT. COL. JOSLIN: Randy Joslin of Space Command. A similar question along
the same lines. The hold-down mechanisms today for rockets that are launched
statically off the pad, I'm not the expert on this, this is a question for the group,
we don't need to be run up to near 100 percent and then verify that the engine's
going and then let it go?
MR. CASSETTI: You mean like the solids?
LT. COL. JOSLIN: So if you were talking about a liquid engine, presumably one
of the previously cited advantages of MagLifter was you would be able to make a
decision to abort if you were not satisfied with the conditions of the engine. It
sounds like maybe there's an issue here because you may be letting go of that.
You may lose that flexibility if you're constrained to not being able to throttle up
to a 100 percent before you're letting go.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: While you're on the rail?
LT. COL. JOSLIN: While you're on the rail.
MR. HOWELL: The consideration has been if you're doing 600 miles an hour,
you could probably abort and stay on the guide rail, but if you're going with the
faster vehicle, like a 1,200, we never even considered staying on the pathway
there. We're going to launch when we get to that point whether we fire the
engine or not.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you have flight capability on that vehicle, you
might just plan on aborting by flying into a recovery runway. It's probably easier
than trying to abort on the guideway itself.
MR. SCHENA: Ron Schena, Signal. I don't know if Marlowe wants to cover that
one or not. There is one rocket car or vehicle that flies off the start, you know, it
does its checkup in three and a half seconds and then when it flies up, it's
looking good, and it throttles up, flies off the launch stand. It's not held down as
the DCX. It's a concept that was proposed by McDonnell Douglas for Ford Aero,
the Delta Clipper operation concept. So there's a precedent for doing it the other
way also, fly off and there could be other more simple mechanisms for possibly,
not necessarily a hold down, but allow you to do the abort in that case.
DR. BLOW: My watch says we've got somewhere around five minutes to be
right about on time. Are there any questions before we hear from the General?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Something about the abort. If you're aborting the
full contents, the aerodynamics are the same, but your ability to maneuver the
vehicle is a lot different and your performance, so that would envision that you
would have to have a quick way of getting rid of these sometimes nasty
propellants, sometimes very nasty in terms of explosives. If they come in contact
with some other subsystem that's burning something back there, it gives you
your hydraulic power and so forth, and so I think it's a better idea, but the
question is, what can you do or consider it?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: On the abort rail, I haven't seen quite what that
looks like yet and I don't picture it in my mind very well, but we are going up this
hill at 45 degrees or something like that at 600 miles an hour or close to it, we
decide to abort, where's the rail for that abort?
DR. BLOW: Well, I've seen it. It's called a decelerator guide rail. That's the
overt negative G and then down, and it's sort of ends there.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Another mile or two?
DR. BLOW: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It would be about the same?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's like turning off a roller coaster.
MR. CASSETTI: What's the lateral acceleration at the rollover?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And for the passengers that are going up to the
hotel in space?
DR. BLOW: Gentlemen, that's a tough issue, isn't it, that decelerator thing?
That's going to linger for a while, I think, and the conceptual diagram that you
see, it's easy to sort of tail off there, but --
MR. HOWELL: The conceptual diagram part, at 90 degrees we do not. So --
DR. BLOW: Now shouldn't there be some crossover from the Holloman effort,
though, in that respect? Because they're going to have to slow down. Although,
it's horizontal, they're going to be slowing down at much higher speeds.
MR. HOWELL: I think there's probably a lot of things that Holloman is doing that
we can use in our design, certainly.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Quick question for the Air Force representative, and
that is on potential future tac sats, you know, Martin Marietta in the past has built
systems that are done launched and so they've got thousands of Gs on
electronics, sensors, seekers and so forth. The bottom line is, possibly it would
make some sense to look at a trade study, future requirements in terms of
sensors in space and what it takes to harden them to higher Gs and follow up on
that, then use your magnetic system to really give you an advantage in terms of
total energy. In other words, get up to ten, 15,000 feet per second at higher
payload with much smaller packaging, but a very simple rocket system. I'll have
some stuff that part of us with Aero got a few years ago, that I think would give
extra incentive considering this technology developing. I think it gets back to
what Jeff Samella said yesterday about assuring the access in space and
vulnerability, et cetera.
DR. BLOW: Mike, did you have one more question?
MR. HENNESSEY: Just on the vertical propulsion, there is a problem and that is
recovery in that we have to build some kind of a roller coaster out of the tunnel
down to, if you wanted to maintain a carriage, otherwise you have to make it and
not have a carriage. If you want to recover the rocket, you have to build
something out of the hole.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Larry, I'd like to make a comment on the question
about hardening the packages for smaller satellites and sensors into space. We
looked at that as a tradeoff on the other end of the curve from what we're talking
about with MagLifter. You can gain quite a bit from the electromagnetic launcher
if you are willing to go to high Gs. High Gs being like a couple of thousand, in
that range, but that is down below what the gun hardened electronics have
already obtained. So that you can get payload performance improvements like
ten, 15, 20 percent pretty easily by going up to very high velocities, so that's a
good approach to take, but then you also have to worry about aerodynamics, the
aero-thermodynamics of the high velocities.
DR. BLOW: Sure. I think that's going to do it. Thanks very much, gentlemen. I
appreciate it.
PRESENTATION BY DR. NEVILLE MARZWELL
NASA JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
DR. BEER: It gives me great pleasure to introduce Neville Marzwell, who has
volunteered to assist us in the strategic planning effort, and he has got five
minutes to do now, because he's got an airplane to catch. So the next time we
get together, we're going to adjourn earlier, so that we don't have people having
to race for airplanes. Neville?
MR. MARZWELL: Thank you. What you have here is to succeed and the best
method to succeed is to remember errors of the past, where we did go wrong.
What have we learned from the past? I'd like to start with an example.
We invented in this country the composite materials, but you never made a cent
out of it. The Japanese made $6.4 billion a year out of using this and making
fishing poles, okay? So we have to learn here that when we invent something,
we're going to use it.
So what it takes to succeed is, basica!ly, we need to have a focused vision. We
need to know specifically where we are. We need to have a fair assessment of
our capability, our abilities and reality of the environment of today. I really don't
feel that the government is in the mood for the next two to three years in jumping
up and having big new starts. We have to be realists.
Money does not recognize borders or boundaries. Money goes where profit
exists, so I don't feel there is a problem in getting capital investment. The
problem is us engineers coming up with a concept that is profitable, a market
that is profitable.
Now, the next question is, what do we have? Okay. We have individuals that
are capable engineers, but we have to be redesigned to come up with a concept
that is focused, that is narrow, that is customer-oriented, that is profitable. We
need to really do public relations with the government. We have a tremendous
multi-billion infrastructure in this country with magnetic superconductors that
really are being degraded. In fact, at request, in my judgment, the government
will be eager and willing to give it to us, just give it, because they are being
degraded fast, so this can be the seed from which to grow.
We need a vision that is founded. The words here are founded and focused.
What, therefore, do we need. We need a near term goal that is realizable and
credible. We need a constant focus on realism. We cannot go into a
hallucination mode of big dreams. We need a small dream with small cost, with
small range, achievable within a short period of time, and I will make
recommendations at the end. We need to assess and understand the market,
the customers, the state corridors. We need to serve their need. We cannot
count on them spending money year after year without seeing some returns now.
We need an organization with specific goals. We need all of us to be integrated
into what Chrysler did in the Viper program. Operation engineers, technologists,
cost analysts teamed together in a Tiger team to really use the best of us in
coming up with an approach.
We need a perception. We need to be perceived and we need an image. An
image that says that we know what we are doing. We are credible. We can
deliver profit. We are a national entity.
We need a process. The process is based on trade analysis between the
various concepts, the various technologies. We need to identify the threads and
the opportunities, and we need to select that jewel in the sand that is near term
goal achievable, low cost, that can give us the credibility and fuel the thrust for
future development and future effort.
We cannot run out of steam at mid course. We need to achieve the critical mass
in funding and capabilities and resources. We need a support base. The
support base is the public, the government, the industry, the education. We
need to say that this has enough enthusiasm to stimulate the people to
understand engineering to get turned on.
We need to become the first, again, like the Mars program, like the Atlas
program, like the Pioneer program.
The government cannot be counted on. I think for the near two to three years if
not four, we cannot count -- we really cannot count on government for
technology money. We need to develop an implementation plan and the
functional plan that has visibility, many minds speak for and risk, reasonable risk
for high payoff, and we need, basically, to take a close look, assess, make an
effort, evaluate the reaction and correct it. We cannot afford any mistake. The
problem is -- no pitfalls. The effort is big, but the effort is doable and
achievable. The payback is also high for us engineers and for the country.
We need to magnify that to the public. We must have their support. We must
have their enthusiasm. One of the ideas is to make a one-page letter every
three months. We need to interact closely with the media. We need to interact
closely with the business. Engineers talking to engineers is not going to make
the dollars. We need a leadership that is striving to please few, because we
cannot please everyone.
Therefore, what is the recommendation? By priority, we need a trade analysis
between the concepts, the various technologies, the various operations, and
come up with that jewel in the sand, that if we stick around it, is doable in short
years. People are not patient. If we cannot deliver something within a
reasonable time, a demo, they're going to lose interest. It's going to die.
We need a center for information. Each one of us has a lot of information, but
we need all that as a ministry of information among us that will have all the
information such that we do not waste money and effort reinventing the wheel.
We need to identify the next step. And that is the jewel that we have to find.
Where do we go from now? What is that next step that really can get political,
business, social, economical strategy behind us? Thank you.

BREAKOUT SESSION SUMMARIES
Breakout Session #1 -- Critical Technologies and Research Issues
The Critical Technologies and Research Issues panel based their assessment
on a series of constraints and assumptions including using a pure rocket vehicle,
as opposed to an aerodynamic vehicle; employing X-33 technology (leveraging
X-33 investment and programmatic heritage); an upgrade path to larger vehicles;
an assumed 5,000 lb. payload to polar orbit resulting in a 'big scale' (700,000 lb.)
total system; and a significant and challenging infrastructure development. It
was noted that a winged SSTO vehicle (example offered by Aerojet) could
significantly increase the payload mass fraction, or conversely, significantly
decrease the gross liftoff weight (GLOW) requirement.
Based on the pure rocket vehicle constraints and assumptions, the panel
determined that the MagLifter concept vehicle was viable. The following
conclusions and technology issues were identified:
The orbital vehicle will have a payload of 1-4% GLOW
-- There is a need to better understand vehicle issues and propulsion
technologies.
MagLifter and MagDriver are different tasks and technologies
"Lift" is insensitive to scale
"Driver" is sensitive to scale
It is imperative to isolate and understand these differences and the
resultant implications
The technologies for the infrastructure may be a function of scale
-- Infrastructure and vehicle interactions are critical to understanding
and implementing the MagLifter concept
• Programmatic interactions must be understood and managed
• It is critical to "pick the right size" based on both market and infrastructure
considerations
• Subsystem risks must be evaluated and application technologies
demonstrated
Breakout Session #2 -- Development and Integration
The Development and Integration panel identified five (5) major topic areas for
discussion and assessment: 1) Market; 2) System Requirements; 3) Prototype
System; 4) Tunnel; and 5) Flight Vehicle Development and System Integration.
The Market will drive both the schedule and the risk. Potential customers will
require both reliability and low relative cost. The current mini-business plan
addresses one near term customer that drives the MagLifter program schedule
and cost. Will this customer (Teledesic) devote sufficient business to MagLifter?
Other market-related issues to be resolved include identifying other post-RLV
target customers, payload capability with other launch systems, determining if
there is a benefit in addressing non-launch user technologies. Also to be
addressed is the issue of failure/back-up coupled with launch rate requirements
-- is there a need for two launch systems?
In the area of System Requirements the panel determined that these are still
being defined and are the critical next steps in the MagLifter development
process. Some major issues identified relative to the development of system
requirements (and "flow-down" to element, subsystem, and component
requirements) include design life (system and element), payload(s), evolutionary
vs. revolutionary growth/upgrade, RMA (reliability/maintainability/availability), and
failure issues and back-up approach.
The major point of concern related to the Prototype System is the definition of
the objectives for the prototype. Specifically, the panel defined the following
topics for further study/definition: requirements for the prototype; technical
demonstration vs. value-added operations system; acceptable projected costs,
schedule, risks to be associated with the prototype; design issues such as
identification of the driver or "forcing function" for a demonstration; and
determination of the level of technical "scalability" to the final function.
Additionally, the issues related to results need to be addressed. These include:
whether to include a tunnel or use existing other facilities; location for the
demonstration; overflight; component vs. total system demonstration(s);
purpose of the demonstration related to 'who & why' for funding (the demo
funding may differ from the operational system funding, i.e. as a technology
proof-of-concept vs. early stage of operational system; and alternative uses of
the prototype.
The Tunnel issues centered around schedule, maintenance, location, and growth
capability for the launch facility. These included questions related to whether a
tunnel (i.e. a bored tunnel in a mountain) vs. a 'notch' (cut-and-covered, or
uncovered along the side of a mountain) was the appropriate form for the launch
facility; proximity of recovery/landing site for reusable launch vehicle; rocket vs.
aerodynamic vehicle impacts; and transportation and logistics support.
The fifth major topic area covered the Flight Vehicle Development and System
Integration. The panel determined that schedule and cost considerations for
development of the flight vehicle, the definition and development of the other
system elements, and the overall system integration process were not sufficiently
understood and required significant study, in both technical and programmatic
terms.
Finally, the Development and Integration panel concluded that the concept was
viable, however, there are several issues to be addressed relative to an
optimistic, single-user driven schedule. There needs to be effort dedicated to a
stringent assessment of technology readiness vs. risk and the resultant schedule
impacts; the need to clearly and comprehensively define system, element, and
component level requirements early on; and the performance of a set of critical
trade studies, such as exit velocity, weight vs. speed, manned vs. unmanned,
and vehicle type; as well as those that are derived from addressing the topics
detailed above.
Breakout Session #3 -- Construction and Engineering
The Construction and Engineering panel consisted of a balanced and broad
spectrum of organizations and focus areas: E/A and construction firms with
focus on engineering design, construction, and operational systems;
government agencies with a system/market/programmatic focus; higher
education (academia) with a systems engineering and feasibility support focus;
mining firms with focus areas in geology and tunnel technology; and
geotechnical/environmental with a siting focus.
This panel addressed four areas: technical feasibility; economic feasibility;
programmatic feasibility; and open issue definition. To address these areas the
panel developed a set of assumptions and groundrules and applied them to two
theoretical cases based on vehicle style (ballistic vs. aerodynamic), facility
descriptions (size, inclination, tunnel type), and system elements included in the
assessment. These two cases are summarized:
CASE I:
• 40-50 degree inclined;
• 10 meter tunnel bored in bedrock; and
• a ballistic, 3 meter RLV with vertical landing capability
CASE I1:
• 20 degree inclination;
• 37 meter diameter 'cut-and-cover' tunnel with adjacent (<2 miles) landing site;
and
• an aerodynamic, 30 meter RLV
(Both Cases I & II assumed SMES feasibility and externally supplied, downrange
tracking compatible with existing facilities, a viable market to support FSD, and a
5,000 lb. payload-to-LEO capability.)
Support and personnel facilities and investment scenarios/considerations were
not considered in this initial assessment.
Technical feasibility for each case was assessed, and the conclusions were: a
10 meter tunnel was feasible assuming acceptable geology
(igneous/metamorphic rock); the 'cut-and-cover' option, while not insensitive to
geology, was less sensitive than the bored tunnel option to specific geologic
conditions.
High maintenance issues were identified such as dewatering, wall
maintenance, and corrosion/weathering issues however, solutions to these
issues were available.
Siting for the facility was identified as a potential major issue, specifically,
finding an area less earthquake prone would be desirable for construction
and maintenance. Finally, lining material that satisfies overpressure,
acoustic, and heat considerations was identified as a topic for investigation.
Economic feasibility analysis favored Case II, predominantly due to the life cycle
cost implications of the bored vs. 'cut-and-cover' tunnel architectures. However,
both cases exceeded the projected costs in the initial mini-business plan.
The programmatic feasibility assessment addressed activities ranging from
performing a comprehensive feasibility study through full scale development,
including a contingency margin. The panel determined that a target time span
(incorporating as much parallel effort as possible) would be 5.5 years from
NTP/ATP to ILC.
The Engineering and Construction panel identified three major areas of open
issues that need resolution to allow progress toward site/facility design. These
were: power requirements and source; definition and validation of the market;
and a better definition of the type and use of facilities (for example, a dual-use,
government-civilian capability). The panel concluded that a feasibility study and
market analysis should be performed as soon as possible to validate initial
MagLifter concepts and options.
Breakout Session #4 -- Operations
The Operations panel concentrated on the critical issue for an inland launch --
overflight/range safety. The panel employed a series of Instantaneous Impact
point traces based on potential MagLifter flight azimuths (from a Colorado launch
site) and developed a set of typical range safety analyses to assess the range
safety/overflight issues for the MagLifter concept.
Based on these analyses, the panel determined that inland launch safety is a
problem, but that a work-around could be developed for relevant issues, and that
this effort should be the first priority for a comprehensive study. The panel
determined that there are two approaches to address this issue -- range layout
and casualty expectancy. The panel noted that launch range safety casualty
expectancy algorithm differs from the algorithm currently under investigation by
the DoT, thus enhancing the conclusion that an investigation into DoT/FAA
airport criteria should be performed.
Other major points/issues related to overflight include: how to obtain valid and
applicable reliability numbers (increasing '9s' is costly); and whether the eastern
launch trace requirements for lower casualty expectancy will drive azimuth
options and the related impacts. The panel also determined that there is a need
to better identify and understand failure modes and to determine flight
termination modes and criteria. Also the panel addressed issues relative to
prototype/demonstration siting to support range testing.
The Operations panel identified several operations, issues to be considered.
These included:
Environmental impacts on operations such as:
-- Weather
-- Launch produced shock wave
-- Single launcher vs. dual systems
Maintenance requirements:
-- Servicing
-- Refurbishing
-- Upgrade
-- Alignment
• Licensing/certification (DOT)
Personnel issues such as
-- training
-- certification
-- quantity
-- type
• Reentry/landing sites
-- location(s)
-- instrument flight conditions
• Transportation and handling/logistic support
In summary, the Operations panel identified several issues, with overflight being
the most critical; however, none of these considerations appear to be
insurmountable given the appropriate effort to 'work' the issue.
Breakout Session #5 -- Implementation Plan
The final of the five breakout sessions was the Implementation Plan panel. This
group addressed issues concerning the MRC organization, critical programmatic
concerns across all technical areas, investment and risks, public relations, and
implementation approaches. The panel investigated the history of similar
technology projects and proposals as the basis for their assessments.
The panel proposed an amendment to the MRC bylaws 'organization chart' to
emphasize areas for infrastructure, legal/risk management, the environment, and
MagLifter external interfaces. The panel determined that, for private investment,
return must be commensurate with perceived risk, thus identifying some related
issues such as perceived technology risks, political risks and incumbent delay,
equity return, and need for definitive revenue projections.
In addition, the Implementation Plan panel identified a series of critical issues.
These included: government assistance relative to assets transfer (land, orbits,
etc.) and incentives; technical risk reduction approaches including the concept
for and sizing of a prototype, the demonstration of 'scalability,' cost and schedule
projections; and an ardent risk assessment program. This panel also addressed
environmental issues, including overflight and launch abort considerations.
These last two issues drove a preference for an aerodynamic vehicle
configuration.
A major set of issues for this panel were those related to legislative and policy
concerns. The panel addressed the need for enabling legislation (at all levels),
the relationship to regulatory agency/agencies, considerations for liability
limitations related to both public and customers, and safety issues. In addition,
there were several market-related policy issues discussed by the panel: the
need (or desire) for an 'anchor tenant(s),' government (DoD, NASA) or
commercial or both; the need for an incentive program for long term
commitments; and the market education that MagLifter is an application of a
mature technology; and the need for an effective public relations program that
emphasizes safety, economic benefit, and international competitiveness.
Finally, this panel identified the need to explore and exploit spin-off technologies,
applications, and benefits as the MagLifter program will have to 'stand on its
own' for ROI and technology transfer benefits proven as commercially viable.
BREAKOUT SESSION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The five Breakout sessions described above were held in parallel. Although
there was a roving 'ambassador' that visited all panels and several panels had
'ambassadors' to each other, the conclusions and recommendations were
predominantly developed independently. There appeared to be a set of common
themes that evolved from these sessions. The driving themes are summarized
below:
• The MagLifter system is technically feasible and viable, although probably not
quite within the projected cost and schedule scopes;
• Market analyses and feasibility studies need to be done immediately to define
the market potential and risks;
Several trade studies need to be performed in the near term related to vehicle
type, facility configuration, and system configuration that incorporate inland
range safety/overflight, technological and programmatic risk/feasibilities,
internal and external interfaces, and growth scenarios;
• A clear and comprehensive understanding and statement of the market,
concept and system requirements is needed soon;
• The prototype/demonstration(s) needs to be defined in terms of program
goals and must be 'scalable' to the operational system;
Public relations, government involvement, investor/customer relations, and
associated/spin-off technologies need to be investigated and developed to
make MagLifter a reality; and
A disciplined, in-depth, cohesive analysis and development effort with a long-
term, total system life orientation is critical to a successful near-term
implementation of the MagLifter program.
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